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Cumulative student loan debt in the United States has now surpassed $1.5 trillion. 
Moreover, since the turn of the century, cohort default rates of these loans have steadily risen 
across all types of institutions. The latest data from the U.S. Department of Education shows 
10.8 percent of borrowers who entered repayment in fiscal year 2015 have defaulted within three 
years. In turn, the first chapter of this paper summarizes student loan policies as well as trends in 
debt and default. Furthermore, it highlights the consequences of high student debt and default for 
individual borrowers and the economy. Results show evidence to support significant decreases in 
purchasing homes, having children, and getting married as results of high student loan debt 
burdens. Other significant findings include many individuals reporting working in jobs outside 
their fields of study, as well as working more than desired. Continuing, this paper evaluates 
higher education-related policies and how such policies have impacted default rates and debt in 
recent years. The general conclusion is that such policies have done little to decrease student loan 
debt and default.  
The second chapter consists of a micro-level Probit regression analysis of student loan 
default, using institutional and individual level characteristics as explanatory variables. The goal 
is to highlight which factors, if any, are more related to high likelihood of defaulting on student 
  
loan payments. Data from the Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Survey is used for 
the analysis. Results are mostly consistent with previous literature. Degree completion and/or the 
level of degree completion has the greatest impact on repayment behavior, although there are 
other factors also associated with default. Furthermore, institutional characteristics have little 
bearing in predicting default once individual level characteristics are added to the model. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A HISTORY OF STUDENT LOANS 
Introduction 
With cumulative student loan debt levels passing $1.5 trillion in the United States, 
financing higher education has become a popular yet contentious topic amongst policymakers, 
educators, administrators, parents, and students alike. While tuition and fees rise, federal 
financial aid has stagnated, turning more students toward loans to make up the difference. In 
turn, student financial aid recipients who default on these loans are receiving a great deal of 
attention from both the government and the public. 
Since the turn of the century, cohort default rates have steadily risen across all types of 
institutions. Data released by the U.S. Department of Education shows 10.8 percent of borrowers 
who entered repayment in fiscal year 2015 defaulted within three years (Official Cohort Default 
Rates, 2018). Although this is down from 11.5 percent the year before, current default rates are 
still significantly higher than they were twenty years ago. 
Increasing reliance on loans for financing higher education likely correlates to rising 
default. Since fiscal year 2000, total federal loans dispersed have increased from $33.7 billion to 
$57.3 billion (in 2016 dollars) (“Trends in Student Aid,” 2017). This is mirrored with rising 
tuition. The average tuition, fees, room and board for full-time undergraduate students at all 
institutions was $14,124 per year in 2000 and $22,432 in 2016 (in 2016 dollars) (Digest of 
Education Statistics, 2016). Federal grant aid has increased from an average of $3,639 per year 
in 2000-01 to $4,305 in 2016-17 (Title IV Program Volume Reports, 2017). Although 
measurable, this increase does not compensate the tuition hikes. In fact, the percentage of 
average public four-year in-state published tuition and fees covered by the maximum Pell Grant 
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(a major source of grant aid for many students) declined from 92 percent in 1998-99 to 60 
percent in 2018-19 (“Trends in College Pricing,” 2018). 
The combination of higher prices (tuition) and less subsidies (federal and state grant aid) 
for postsecondary education has led to more students taking out loans1 and those students require 
higher amounts2 (“Trends in Student Aid,” 2017).  
All things considered, rising student loan debt is unsurprising. That being said, rising debt 
and rising default have become major issues for policymakers to address. Burdensome student 
debt likely impacts individuals’ job market decisions, housing decisions, and familial choices, all 
of which have larger multiplicative effects on economic markets.  
For this reason, the goal of this paper is to evaluate higher education-related policies to 
determine how such policies have impacted debt levels and default rates over time. Such an 
analysis will allow for the isolation of specific policy changes and their impacts on the student 
loan market. Furthermore, this paper will examine economic and labor market consequences of 
student loan debt levels and default rates as they are today. 
Background: Why College is Important 
 For students who are at risk of having unmanageable student loan debt, is higher 
education still worth the investment? In short, yes. 
 Higher education has long been considered as a gateway to the middle class. It is 
common knowledge that college graduates, on average, benefit from their degrees monetarily, as 
demonstrated in dozens of reports. Even if monetary advantages were the only benefits of higher 
                                                 
1 In 2001-02, there were 5.35 million borrowers of Subsidized and unsubsidized federal loans. By 2016-17, there 
were 8.2 million borrowers. 
 
2 In 2016-17, undergraduates taking subsidized and unsubsidized Direct Loans borrowed an average of $6,590—
$690 more (in 2016 dollars) than a decade earlier (2001-02). 
 
  3  
education, it makes financial sense to invest in education for most high school graduates. Often, 
however, there are several other non-monetary effects of higher education that tend to be 
overlooked when determining an individual’s optimal investment in education. The goal of this 
section is to demonstrate the full scope of benefits that arise from increased education. 
Earnings 
Mincer (1974) developed what would be aptly named the Mincer equation, which 
demonstrates the relationship between schooling, work experience, and earnings. The most 
widely used variation of this equation is as follows: 
𝑙𝑛[𝑌(𝑠, 𝑥)] =  𝛼 + 𝜌𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽0𝑥 +  𝛽1𝑥
2 +  𝜀 
where Y(s,x) is the wage or earnings at schooling level s and work experience x, 𝜌𝑠 is the rate of 
return to schooling (assumed to be the same for each additional year of schooling) and 𝜀 is a 
mean zero residual with E(𝜀|s,x). Over time, several economists used variations of this equation 
to estimate the return schooling. Trostel (2015) quantifies the earnings differential with respect to 
schooling in terms on dollars earned yearly. In the year 2012, the average annual earnings for 
high school graduates is $24,000, which is substantially higher than the average of $14,000 a 
year for those without a high-school diploma or GED. The difference in earnings from college 
attendance is often referred to as the college earnings premium. Trostel calculates this to be 134 
percent (an additional $32,000 in earnings annually) for individuals with a bachelor’s degree 
over just high-school completion. The earnings premium for graduate degrees (master’s, 
professional and doctorates) is 46 percent ($26,000), relative to average earnings of those with 
bachelor’s degrees as their highest education credential. 
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Other Private Benefits  
Considering monetary benefits alone, a simple benefit-cost analysis of higher education 
provides evidence of a worth-while investment. There are non-monetary benefits of higher 
education as well, further increasing the payoff of investment in higher education. Health 
benefits include, the likelihood of having health insurance is 47 percent greater with a bachelor's 
degree than a high school diploma (Trostel, 2015). Daily smoking rates and alcohol consumption 
decrease with education, while healthy lifestyle choices increase with education (Oreopoulos & 
Salvanes, 2011). Life expectancy is greater for those with more education. Retirement security 
grows with education as well. Having a retirement plan at all increases with education, as does 
the amount saved in retirement accounts (Trostel, 2015). Job safety and security benefits include: 
the incidence of workers’ compensation decreases with more education, as does the rate of 
unemployment and the likelihood of being out of the labor force (Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2011; 
Trostel, 2015). Other private benefits include financial literacy increases with education, 
marriage rates increases, and reported happiness levels increases. Divorce rates decrease with 
more education. Incarceration rates decrease dramatically with more education, with the highest 
rate of incarcerated individuals being those without a high school diploma (Oreopoulos & 
Salvanes, 2011; Trostel, 2015). There are also fiscal externalities; higher incomes correlate with 
higher tax revenue for the government to run socially beneficial programs. More education is 
correlated with more volunteerism, employment at a non-profit organizations, and charitable 
contributions (when controlling for income). Finally, more education is correlated with higher 
political participation and community involvement (Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2011; Trostel, 
2015).  
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 Ultimately, if the discounted future value outweighs the cost, including the cost of loans, 
the student should enroll in college and borrow if necessary. Because higher education is costly, 
it often results in low and middle-income students facing the decision to take out student loans to 
finance their degrees, attend college part time while working full time, delay college entry while 
saving money for college, or not attend at all. Still, there is overwhelming evidence showing 
investment in higher education is worth it and is profitable, especially over a lifetime. 
Background: The Structure of Federal Student Loan Programs 
 Part of understanding student loan default is understanding student loans themselves, and 
the repayment options borrowers face. Loans for financing higher education are traditionally 
federally backed, although there are several companies that specialize in the lending of private 
loans for postsecondary education. 
 To qualify for federal student loans, independent students and dependent students’ 
parents complete the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), administered through 
the U.S. Department of Education. The financial information entered into this application is then 
used to determine a student’s eligibility for federal and state grant and loan aid. Students 
demonstrating financial need may be eligible for Direct Subsidized Loans or Perkins Loans (not 
administered after September 30, 2017) from the federal government. Additionally, all students 
who fill out the FAFSA qualify for additional Direct Unsubsidized Loans, and if a graduate 
student, Direct Graduate Loans, and Graduate PLUS Loans (“Loans,” 2018). 
 Upon accepting any federal student loan, first time borrowers must complete entrance 
counseling to ensure they understand the responsibilities and obligations they are agreeing to. 
Additionally, all borrowers sign a Master Promissory Note, legally binding them to the terms and 
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conditions of repayment. Similarly, exit counseling is required each time borrowers drop below 
half-time enrollment, graduate, or leave school (“Student Loans,” 2018). 
If students do not fill out the FAFSA, or the federal loans provided are not enough to 
meet their financial need, some students turn to private loan servicers to make up the difference. 
Private loan terms, such as the amount you can borrow and forms of repayment, vary by lender. 
Often, they require a co-signer and credit check, and may require repayment while still in school. 
Types of Federal Loans 
The U.S. Department of Education offers low-interest loans for eligible students to help 
cover the cost of higher education. Depending on financial need, and whether the borrower is an 
undergraduate or graduate student, they may be eligible for several different types of loans 
(“Loans,” 2018). 
Direct Subsidized Loans. Direct Subsidized Loans, sometimes known as Stafford Loans or 
Direct Stafford Loans, are only available to undergraduate students who demonstrate financial 
need who are enrolled at least half-time. As of the 2018-19 academic year, interest rates for such 
loans is 5.05%. Terms unique to Direct Subsidized Loans is that the U.S. Department of 
Education pays the interest on these loans while borrowers are in school, during the six month 
grace period after graduation, and during a period of deferment.  
Direct Unsubsidized Loans. Direct Unsubsidized Loans are available to undergraduate and 
graduate students regardless of financial need. Unlike Direct Subsidized Loans however, 
borrowers of Direct Unsubsidized Loans are responsible for paying the interest accrued during 
all periods. The interest rate for Direct Unsubsidized Loans for undergraduates 5.05% for loans 
dispersed between July 1, 2018 and July 1, 2019. The interest rate for graduate students is 6.6%. 
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Graduate PLUS Loans. Graduate PLUS Loans are for all graduate or professional students 
enrolled at least half-time. For Direct PLUS Loans first dispersed on or after July 1, 2018, and 
before July 1, 2019, the interest rate is 7.6%. 
The school in which students attend determine individual loan amount eligibility. 
However, there are federal limits on the amount of subsidized and unsubsidized loans one can 
receive during each academic year. There are also aggregate loan limits for both undergraduate 
and graduate study. These limits depend on what year in school the borrower is, and whether he 
or she is a dependent or independent student.  
Repayment of Federal Loans 
Table 1 - Federal loan repayment plans 
Repayment Plan Who Qualifies Years to 
Pay 
Monthly Payment 
Standard All 10 Same throughout repayment. 
Graduated All 10 Increases every two years. 
Extended Direct and FFEL loans 
from after Oct. 7, 1998, 
greater than $30,000 
balance. 
25 10% or 15% of discretionary 
income. 
Income-Based All who have a partial 
financial hardship. 
20 or 25 10% or 15% of discretionary 
income. Will never be more 
than standard payments. 
Pay As You Earn Direct loans from after 
Oct. 1, 2007. Must have 
partial financial hardship. 
20 10% of discretionary income. 
Will never be more than 
standard payments. 
Revised Pay As 
You Earn 
All Direct loans. 20 or 25 10% of discretionary income. 
Income-
Contingent 
All Direct loans. 25 The lesser of 20% of 
discretionary income or what 
you’d pay on a 12-year fixed 
payment plan. 
Income-Sensitive FFEL program loans. 10 Based on annual income. 
Each lender’s formula for 
determining amount varies. 
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Presently, the Standard Repayment Plan functions as the default option for the repayment of 
student loans. Below is a table detailing the various repayment plans. 
In addition to the above repayment plans, there are also debt consolidation loans for 
students who would like to simplify loan repayment. Consolidation can be helpful for students 
who have federal loans with different loan providers. They allow any variable loan rate plans to 
become fixed rate plans and can lower monthly payments for borrowers in some cases. 
Consolidation is not for everyone, however. Because consolidation usually increases the period 
of time to repay loans, borrowers might make more payments and pay more in interest than 
would be the case if they don’t consolidate. Consolidation may also lead to loss of certain 
borrower benefits—such as interest rate discounts, principal rebates, or some 
loan cancellation benefits—that are associated with their current loans. If borrowers are paying 
current loans under an income-driven repayment plan, or if they have made qualifying payments 
toward Public Service Loan Forgiveness, consolidating current loans will cause the loss of credit 
for any payments made toward income-driven repayment plan forgiveness or Public Service 
Loan Forgiveness (“Loan 
Consolidation,” 2018). 
Under certain circumstances, borrowers can receive a deferment or forbearance that 
allows a temporary reprieve from making payments on federal student loans or a temporary 
reduction in the dollar amount of payments. Stopping or reducing payments may help 
avoid default. The main difference between the two is that during deferment, borrowers are not 
responsible for paying for the interest that accrues during the time in which you are deferring. 
Not all loans qualify for deferment. Students must apply for deferment or forbearance with their 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Office 
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loan service provider and must meet specific qualification criteria (“Deferment and 
Forbearance,” 2018).  
Debt Burdens, Delinquency, Default, and Their Consequences 
Consequences of not paying student loans payments include delinquency and default. A 
loan becomes delinquent the first day in which a payment is missed and will remain so until the 
past due amount is paid and the borrower has resumed up-to-date payments. A delinquency of 
90-days or more will be reported to the three major national credit bureaus, which will lower the 
borrower’s credit score and negatively affect future finances (“Understanding Delinquency and 
Default,” 2018). 
If loans continue to be delinquent, the loan may go into default. The point when a loan is 
considered to be in default varies depending on the type of loan received. Loans made under the 
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program or the Federal Family Education Loan Program 
are considered defaulted after failing to make scheduled payments for at least 270 days.  
Borrowers who go into default may face severe consequences such as acceleration of the 
loan (having the entire balance due at once), seizing of tax return funds or garnished wages as 
form of repayment, or even judicial action. Any judicial action taken towards a defaulted 
borrower may come with court costs, attorney’s fees, and other costs associated with the 
collection process, all of which the borrower may be liable for. Additional consequences include 
loss of eligibility of additional federal financial aid, and the borrower is no longer eligible for 
deferment or forbearance of any kind. Borrowers lose the ability to choose a repayment plan 
when they default. Some schools will even choose to withhold a borrower’s academic transcript 
until the defaulted loan is satisfied (“Understanding Delinquency and Default,” 2018). 
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Negative impacts on a borrower’s credit score can be very severe, and it may take several 
years to reestablish a good credit record. A poor credit history is indicative of a risky borrower, 
and therefore credit servicers are more likely to deny credit, or subject the borrower to higher 
interest rates. This holds true for credit cards, home and auto loans, and other minor forms of 
consumer credit. It does not stop there, however. A poor credit score/history may generate 
trouble signing up for utilities, getting homeowner’s insurance, getting a cell phone plan, and/or 
getting approval to rent an apartment or office space. 
Revoking of Professional Licenses 
 Some 15 states allow for government agencies to seize state-issued professional licensed 
from borrowers who default on their loans. This is down from 19 states one year ago. Borrowers 
subject to the potential seizure of their licenses include firefighters, nurses, teachers, lawyers, 
massage therapists, barbers, psychologists, and real estate brokers. Obviously, without the legal 
means to practice a profession, it is difficult to make enough money to come back from default. 
Moreover, if borrowers settle the payments on their loans eventually, they are still subject to 
large fees to get their licenses back. Borrowers in South Dakota face potential loss of driver’s 
licenses if they default on their loans, as well as denial of hunting, fishing, and camping permits 
(Silver-Greenberg et al., 2017). 
Postgraduate Plans 
 Recent studies have focused on how educational debt affects borrowers’ choice of first 
jobs and/or decisions about enrolling in graduate or first professional schooling. That is, students 
who feel more constrained by their educational debt are more likely to consider their debt when 
choosing a first job (Minicozzi, 2005; Rothstein & Rouse, 2011). Such considerations lead some 
graduates to seek higher paying initial jobs, which often have the lowest rates of upward mobility 
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(Minicozzi, 2005). Similarly, students with debt levels greater than $10,000 are less likely to take 
jobs in traditionally low-paying sectors, such as government, public service, nonprofits, and 
education (Rothstein & Rouse, 2011). Furthermore, in the long run, graduates who work outside 
their major-related field report lower average earnings than their counterparts who work within 
their field of study (Thomas, 2000). 
 Educational debt may or may not be related to the entrance of graduate or first 
professional schooling. Several studies conclude there is no significant correlation between 
students’ undergraduate debt and their decision to enter graduate or first professional schooling 
(Baum & Saunders, 1998; Baum & Schwartz, 1988; Millett, 2003; Nettles, 1989; Weiler, 1994). 
On the other hand, a handful of researchers find there to be a significant negative influence debt 
burdens have on students’ transition into graduate school (Fox, 1992; Tsapogas & Cahalan, 
1996; Wilder & Baydar, 1991). Murphy (1994) and Sanford (1980) find positive correlations 
between debt and the transition into graduate school.  
Delaying of Major Purchases and Life Milestones 
 High monthly loan payments makes saving difficult for many borrowers. The 2014 
Gallup-Perdue Report highlights how student debt burdens affect large purchases (“The 2014 
Gallup-Perdue Index Report,” 2014). The study finds 36 percent of all graduates with student 
loans report delaying buying a home, which is a significant concern for the U.S. economy (Deep 
& Domanski, 2002). The Federal Reserve reports a 1 to 2 percentage point drop in 
homeownership with every 10 percent increase in student debt during the first five years after 
exiting school (Mezza et al., 2016). Moreover, according to the National Association of Realtors, 
more than 70 percent of people ages 22 to 35 blame their student loans for why they have not 
bought a house yet (“Student Loan Debt and Housing,” 2017). More than 80 percent of 
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respondents say this is because they cannot save for a down payment because of student debt. 
Over 50 percent reported having too high of debt-to-income ratios and therefore unable to 
qualify for a mortgage. About one-third of borrowers with student loan debt between $30,000 
and $50,000 and more than $70,000 expect to be delayed eight years or more from purchasing a 
home. This study also finds 72 percent of this cohort do not take vacations because of student 
loan debt; 65 percent postpone purchasing a car. 
 Some 40 percent of borrowers of greater than $25,000 responded that they believe their 
student debt impacts their ability to start a small business. Some borrowers also report delaying 
moving out of their parents’ house, having children, and getting married, as well as renting solo, 
purchasing entertainment, purchasing clothes, living closer to school/work, and owning a pet 
(“Student Loan Debt and Housing,” 2017). 
 Student debt burdens also have affected retirement saving amongst the youngest 
borrowers. The National Association of Realtors reports 61 percent of student loan borrowers 
have been unable to make contributions to a retirement account at one point or more. Thirty-two 
percent reported they did, but in reduced amounts. 
Current and Past Student Loan Policies and Regulations 
 Understanding past and present rules and regulations regarding student loans and default 
is vital to analyze the effectiveness of such policies. The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; 
P.L. 89-329) marked the beginning of such policies. It was first signed into law by President 
Lyndon B. Johnson on November 8, 1965 to enhance the resources of colleges and universities, 
and to provide financial assistance to lower- and middle-income families to attend such schools 
(McCants, 2003). 
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 Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 authorized Federal Student Aid programs 
including loans, grants, and work-study programs. Notably, this act established the Federal 
Family Education Loan Program (FFEL) which became the forefront for higher education loans 
from then on (“Federal Family Education Loan Program,” 2014). It was a system of private 
student loans that were subsidized and guaranteed by the United States federal government. That 
is, commercial lenders used their private capital to finance loans under the program and the 
federal government subsidized them to maintain low interest rates. These loans were also 
guaranteed by the federal government, protecting the private companies from financial loss if a 
borrower defaulted.  
The Higher Education Act of 1965 has since been reauthorized in 1968, 1972, 1976, 
1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, and 2008. Some years changed very little regarding student loans. Other 
years led to substantial changes in the way we view student loans. The 1986 HEA 
Reauthorization and the Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1988 and 1990 raised loan limits and 
interest rates, as well as added restrictions on students, lenders, and institutions in attempts to 
address the alarming increase in defaults (Hannah, 1996). Furthermore, student loans replaced 
grants as the dominant form of federal aid; the gap between grant aid and loans continued to 
widen (Schenet, 1992). 
The 1992 Reauthorization of the HEA led to another significant shift into loan-based 
financing of higher education (Hannah, 1996). The Student Loan Reform Act of 1993, as part of 
the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-213), would phase in direct lending, in 
addition to the government backed private loans. This became known as the William D. Ford 
Federal Direct Loan Program (“A History of Direct Loans”). Colleges and universities then had a 
choice of which loan program to use. Most institutions continued using private guaranteed loans 
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until 2008 when credit market disruptions threatened the ability of many private lenders to make 
loans under the program (“Student Loan History”). 
The 1998 HEA Reauthorization discussions focused a great deal on growing student loan 
default rates (Gross et al., 2010). Research at the time highlighted certain types of schools for 
having particularly high default rates. In response, the new policy eliminated Pell grant eligibility 
for high-default schools (rates higher than 25 percent for three years in a row), as well as 
required schools to post a surety when appealing this loss of eligibility (“Reauthorization of 1998 
Higher Education Act,” 2005). Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), as well as 
Tribally Controlled Colleges and Universities (TCCUs) were exempt from these rules until 2004. 
Additionally, the definition of default was changed from 180 days to 270 days of continuous 
delinquency (Burd, 1998). This policy also prohibited the consolidation of any defaulted loans. 
The 2008 HEA Reauthorization, also known as the Higher Education Opportunity Act 
(HEA; P.L. 110-315), changed the default calculation window to three years instead of two, 
allowing for more detailed analysis of changes over time. The maximum Pell grant award 
increased slightly, and interest rates on subsidized loans were reduced. This bill also capped loan 
repayment at 15 percent of an individual’s discretionary income, and allowed for loan 
forgiveness for public servants in the Direct Loan Program. 
 President Barack Obama proposed the elimination of the FFEL program in 2010. The 
Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act, a rider bill to the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152), terminated the FFEL program. The Federal Direct 
Loan Program provides all federal student loans now. 
 The Higher Education Act of 1965 has not since been reauthorized. However, there is a 
current bill proposed titled the Promoting Real Opportunity, Success, and Prosperity through 
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Education Reform (PROSPER) Act which intends to extend the HEA once more (“Promoting 
Real Opportunity,” 2017). The most relevant part of this bill is the movement towards a new 
Federal ONE Loan Program. This program would consolidate the six current loans available into 
one unsubsidized loan for undergraduates, one for graduates, and one for parents. The bill also 
allows financial aid administrators to set individual lower loan limits for certain categories of 
borrowers to encourage responsible lending. Institutions are required to disburse loans to 
students on a weekly or monthly basis. The bill eliminates fees borrowers pay for each loan 
disbursed and maintains the market-driven interest rates set in current law. With regards to 
repayment, the PROSPER Act consolidates to one standard 10-year repayment plan and one 
income-driven repayment (IDR) plan. Furthermore, the PROSPER Act will create a program-
level loan repayment rate tied to program eligibility. This replaces the current policy of using 
institutional-level cohort default rates, which means federal student aid will be targeted towards 
programs whose graduates have the ability to repay their student loans (PSOSPER Act Bill 
Summary, 2017). 
Trends in Student Aid 
 Student aid catches a lot of attention due to its inherently large numbers, especially the 
$1.5 trillion in U.S. student debt. Measuring levels of aggregate student aid can be difficult 
however, due to consistently changing enrollment levels. Total spending grew significantly when 
enrollment spiked during the Great Recession between 2008-09 and 2010-11. Specifically, 
during that time Pell Grant expenditures nearly doubled from $20.4 billion (in 2017 dollars) to 
$40.1 billion (Federal Pell Grant Program, 2018). When enrollment levels declined and 
financial circumstances of students became more stable as the economy recovered, total 
expenditures declined once more.  
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Moreover, evaluating trends in student aid should be done concurrently with evaluation 
of trends in college pricing. Between 2008-09 and 2018-19, published in-state tuition and fees 
for public 4-year institutions climbed 3.1 percent beyond the inflation rate, 2.3 percent for 
private nonprofit 4-year institutions, and 3.0 percent for public 2-year institutions (Annual Survey 
of Colleges, 2018). Figure 1 shows an upward trend of the average inflation-adjusted published 
tuition and fee rates by sector, by decade, from 1988-89 to 2018-19. There have been consistent 
and significant increases in published prices across all institution types over the past thirty years, 
so it is unsurprising aggregate student aid expenditures have risen. 
Figure 1 - Average Published Tuition and Fees in 2018 Dollars by Sector, 1988-89 to 2018-19 
by decade 
 
Source: College Board, Annual Survey of Colleges, 2018-19 
Federal aid comes in many forms aside from loans. In 2017-18, 12.0 million people 
received some form of Federal Education Tax Benefits, with an average aid of $1,390 (“Trends 
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in Student Aid,” 2018). There were 7.0 million people received a Federal Pell Grant, with an 
average of $4,010. Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants (FSEOG) were given 
to 1.4 million recipients ($530 average aid). An estimated 601,000 students received Federal 
Work-Study (FWS) funding, which allows students to receive compensation from work on 
campus (“Annual Federal Program Data Books,” 2018). This is down from 698,000 in 2007-08. 
In 2017, Congress passed legislation increasing the generosity of education benefits for veterans. 
Since then, an estimated 767,000 veteran students received an average of $15,310 in Post-9/11 
GI Bill Veterans Benefits (Office of Budget and Finance, 2018).  
Annual parent and student borrowing for higher education has decreased in real terms 
consistently since 2011 but are still measurably higher than twenty years ago. Total borrowing 
each year rose from $49.3 billion (in 2017 dollars) in 1997-98 to $127.7 billion in 2010-11, and 
then down to $105.5 billion in 2017-18. The recent decline is largely attributed to the decrease in 
enrollment and financial need after the Great Recession. Over that time there was a real change 
in students’ borrowing behavior as well. This can be seen in Figure 2. In 1997-98, 61 percent of 
Stafford loans were subsidized. By 2007-08, the percentage had declined to 52 percent. In 2017-
18, only 30 percent of Stafford loans are subsidized. In general, however, student borrowing 
from the Direct Loan Program declined 22 percent between 2012-13 and 2017-18. In the same 
time, both Parent PLUS and Grad PLUS loans increased 22 and 27 percent respectively (“Trends 
in Student Aid,” 2018). 
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Figure 2 - Total Federal and Nonfederal Loans in 2017 Dollars 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, Cumulative Student 
Loan Debt (2017 dollars) in billions, 1998 to 2015  
In 2017-18, there were 7.9 million recipients of Direct Subsidized and/or Unsubsidized 
Loans, totaling $55.5 billion for undergraduate students and $37.6 billion for graduate students 
(averaging $6,570 for each undergraduate and $18,860 for each graduate student). Fewer than 
290,000 students received aid through the Perkins Loan Program in 2017-18. However, the share 
of these federal education loans going to graduate students (who constitute about 14 percent of 
postsecondary students) is 40 percent ($37.6 billion out of $93.1 billion) in 2017-18. The 
aggregate federal student loan limit for dependent undergraduate students is $31,000. 
Independent students can borrow an additional $26,500 over a lifetime. Graduate and 
professional students can borrow up to a lifetime total of $138,500 in subsidized and 
unsubsidized loans (including undergraduate loans). Additionally, they can borrow up to the full 
cost of attendance through the Grad PLUS program each year. 
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The number of parents borrowing Parent PLUS Loans in 2017-18 was only 12 percent 
(779,000) of the number of undergraduates borrowing Direct Loans, but the average parent loan 
amount was 2.5 times as much ($16,450) as the average undergraduate student loan. The Parent 
PLUS program allows borrowing to cover entire student budgets less other aid, and can be used 
for an unlimited number of years of enrollment. Parents may also borrow through home equity 
loans, credit cards, or other sources of credit, not reflected in traditional student loan data. 
Only 6 percent of undergraduate students took out private loans in 2015-16, but 16 
percent had borrowed private loans at some point during their undergraduate study. According to 
the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study, the average amount borrowed was $21,300. Such 
loans do not carry borrower protections included in the federal student loan programs. They 
often also have higher interest rates. 
Cumulatively, the average student debt burden among those who borrowed for public and 
private nonprofit institutions was $28,500 in 2016-17 ($26,900 for public four-year institutions, 
and $32,600 for private nonprofit four-year institutions) (“Trends in Student Aid,” 2018). About 
58 percent of graduates from public four-year institutions graduated with some kind of debt in 
2016-17, and 61 percent of graduates of private nonprofit four-year institutions did. Students at 
for-profit institutions generally borrow more and accumulate higher average levels of debt than 
their nonprofit counterparts. 
Trends in Repayment and Default 
Status of outstanding federal student loans can include: in repayment, in school, 
deferment, forbearance, grace period, or default. Figure 3 shows repayment status of the Federal 
Education Loan Portfolio, for the fourth quarter of the 2016, 2017, and 2018 fiscal years. Of the 
45 percent in repayment, participation in Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) was 29 percent in 
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March 2018, which limits payments to an affordable percentage of an affordable percentage of 
their discretionary incomes. These borrowers tend to have higher average balances, however. 
About 47 percent of borrowers used a standard repayment plan, for a term of 10 years or less. 
Ten percent of borrowers used a standard repayment plan, for a term of 10 years or more, and 14 
percent of borrowers participated in a graduated repayment plan (Federal Student Loan 
Portfolio, 2018). Figure 3 details information regarding repayment status of borrowers, for the 
fourth quarter of 2016 through 2018. Table 2 displays information for 2018. 
 
Figure 3 - Repayment Status of Federal Education Loan Portfolio, Fourth Quarter FY16-FY18 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, Federal Student Loan 
Portfolio 
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Table 2 - Average federal loan balance, number of borrowers, and total balance by repayment 
status, second quarter 2018 
 
Average Balance Number of Borrowers (in 
millions) 
Total Balance (in 
billions) 
Repayment $34,600  18.6 $643.0  
In-school $19,800  7.2 $142.5  
Deferment $33,200  3.8 $126.3  
Forbearance $42,600  2.8 $119.3  
Grace period $19,300  1.3 $25.1  
Default $18,600  7.0 $130.3  
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, Federal Student Loan 
Portfolio 
 
Repayment heavily relies on completion (earning a degree) and also varies by sector. For 
borrowers entering repayment in 2009-10 and 2010-11, 67 percent of federal student loan 
borrowers who graduated were in repayment within five years of graduation, while only 41 
percent of non-completers were in repayment (Federal Student Loan Portfolio, 2018). 
Completers had higher repayment rates across all sectors. However, completers from the for-
profit sector had lower repayment rates than non-completers in four-year public and nonprofit 
private sectors. Table 3 shows the rate of repayment by completion status and sector, for 
borrowers entering repayment in 2009-10 and 2010-11. It is important to note, however, some 
borrowers enrolled in Income-Driven Repayment plans pay nothing but are still considered in 
good standing. For others, the payment is so small it does not cover interest owed, leading to an 
increase in the balance owed. Borrowers in deferment or forbearance are also considered to be in 
good standing without actively repaying. 
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Table 3 - Federal student loan five-year repayment rate by completion status: Borrowers 
entering repayment in 2009-10 and 2010-11 
Sector Completers Non-completers 
Public Two-Year 68% 39% 
Public Four-Year 79% 54% 
Private Nonprofit Four-Year 80% 54% 
For-Profit 43% 26% 
All 67% 41% 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, Federal Student Loan 
Portfolio 
Borrowers in delinquency or default are in bad standing. Unsurprisingly, there is a 
positive correlation between debt amounts and default rates. This correlation is significantly 
present among the years the total debt burdens were the greatest. Figure 4 shows the national 
default rates over time. U.S. Department of Education officials attributed the steep decline in 
default during the early 1990s was due to an improving economy, better management of the 
federal loan program, as well as President Clinton’s push to cut default and increase collections 
(“Default Rate For Student Loans Drop,” 1998). In the early 1990s, lawmakers also made it 
easier to garnish wages for delinquent borrowers and prevent defaulted borrowers from taking 
out new loans (Perlstein, 1998). The marker at year 2011 denotes the change in measurement of 
default from two years to three years. Considering this change in measurement, an upward trend 
in default since 2005 is still visible.  
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Figure 4 - National Default Rates, 1987 to 2015 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, National Cohort 
Default Rate, 1987 to 2015 
Default rates vary heavily between less than two-year, two-year, and four-year 
institutions, as well as public, private nonprofit, and private for-profit institutions. Figures 5, 6, 
and 7 provide visual representations of the discrepancies. Highest rates are amongst less than 
two-year and two-year institutions, and for-profit institutions. In 2015, the total default rate for 
all public institutions was 10.3 percent. For private nonprofit institutions, the default rate was 7.1 
percent and for private for-profit institutions, the default rate was 15.6 percent.  
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Figure 5 - Cohort Default Rates of Public Institutions, by Level, 2001 to 2011 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, 2-year Cohort Default 
Rate 2009 to 2015 
 
Figure 6 - Cohort Default Rates of Private Nonprofit Institutions, by Level, 2001 to 2011 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, 2-year Cohort 
Default Rate 2009 to 2015 
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Figure 7 - Cohort Default Rates of Private For-profit Institutions, by Level, 2001 to 2011 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, 2-year Cohort Default 
Rate 2009 to 2015 
Notice default rates at proprietary schools have fallen since 2009. At that time, rates were 
particularly high due to the economic recession and the peak in popularity of for-profit 
institutions. Enrollment levels at private for-profit institutions peaked around 2009-10 and have 
since declined to levels similar to pre-recessionary time (“Digestion of Education Statistics,” 
2017). Moreover, enrollment across all sectors increased during the Great Recession, but for-
profit institutions saw the biggest decline in enrollment after the economy recovered. 
Analysis of National Default Data 
 To provide more insight regarding national default rates over time and how policy has 
affected them, aggregated data will be examined and investigated to highlight potential trends. 
This analysis will be three-fold. Firstly, it will summarize the leading factors affecting default, as 
mentioned by the HEA. These specifically include institutional sector and minority serving 
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classifications. Secondly, it will evaluate which policies, if any, made impactful changes in 
cohort default rates. Lastly, it will measure how student loan debt levels and default influence 
large purchases and lifetime milestones, as to measure how the student loan market effects the 
economy as a whole. This will primarily be done by comparing student loan debt to house sales, 
birth rates, and consumption. 
Factors Contributing to Default 
As mentioned before, the HEA targets specific types of institutions as being more prone 
to higher default rates. Identifying such factors allows for policy adaptation to focus on particular 
problem areas. Data from the Federal Student Aid Data Center provides three-year cohort default 
rates by institution from 2009 to 2015. This data is merged with other identifying institutional 
characteristics from the National Center for Education Statistics Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System. 
Variables that will be assessed explicitly include institutional sector, and whether or not 
the institution in question is considered a Historically Black College or University (HBCU). Data 
regarding other forms of minority serving institutions is not available in these datasets. HBCUs 
have significantly higher cohort default rates across all public and private nonprofit four- and 
two-year institutions. There are no less than two-year HBCUs or for-profit HBCUs. The average 
default rate for an HBCU in this sample is 18.0 percent, while it is 11.3 percent for all other 
institutions.  
Public two-year institutions have the highest average default rate at 16.6 percent. 
Generally two-year and less than two-year institutions have particularly high default rates. For-
profit institutions of all levels have high default rates, with the average rate being 13.7 percent. 
Table 4 details average three-year cohort default rates from 2015, by institution sector. 
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Table 4 - Average three-year cohort default rates, 2015 
Institutional sector Default rate 
Four-year 7.8% 
 Public 9.0% 
 Private nonprofit 6.6% 
 Private for-profit 12.0% 
Two-year 15.3% 
 Public 16.6% 
 Private nonprofit 10.1% 
 Private for-profit 14.3% 
Less than two-year 13.5% 
 Public 11.3% 
 Private nonprofit 12.5% 
 Private for-profit 13.9% 
Sources: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, Three-year Cohort 
Default Rates by Institution; National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System 
Changes in Default Rates Over Time 
 Comparing national default rates before and after each policy changes is easiest done 
visually, due to the nature of the limited data. The Federal Student Aid Data Center only tracks 
aggregated default rates long enough to be able to compare them to policy changes. Figure 8 
shows national cohort default rates from 1987 to 2015, with markers denoting HEA 
reauthorizations in 1992, 1998, and 2008. Additionally, due to the nature of the data, default 
rates before the 1986 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act is not represented. The 
national unemployment rate is overlaid on the same graph as a proxy for economic conditions. 
Negative economic conditions are heavily influential in increasing default rates, especially when 
people lose their jobs and their incomes decrease. 
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Figure 8 - National Default Rates, 1987 to 2015, by HEA Reauthorization 
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, National Cohort 
Default Rate; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Unemployment 
Rate, 1987 to 2015 
 The marker at year 1992 denotes the phasing in of direct lending into the federal student 
loan program, but did nothing to directly affect default. As mentioned before, during that time, 
President Clinton and Congress made it easier to garnish wages to collect payments from 
defaulters and the federal loan program was better managed in general. Moving forward, 
however, 1998 marked a significant change in student loan default policy. When individual 
institutions began accepting responsibility for their former students defaulting on loans, the goal 
was to eliminate these so-called high-risk institutions from the default equation. Evidence shows 
following the 1998 reauthorization, national default rates decreasing slightly, but stagnating for 
the most part. Evidence of the effectiveness of this policy may be seen best in the early 2000s 
  29  
when economic conditions declined temporarily and unemployment rose. This may also have 
been related to the change in definition of default. Prior to 1998, loans were considered in default 
after 180 days of delinquency. When this changes to 270 days, borrowers had significantly more 
time to make payments before loans defaulted. This can be deceiving, because many borrowers 
were still more than 180 days delinquent but had not technically defaulted yet. 
Little policy was able to prevent increasing national default at the start of the 2008 
recession. In fact, notice default rates began to rise roughly a year before the recession officially 
began. Furthermore, even when economic conditions improved and unemployment decreased, 
default rates continued to rise. A caveat to this is the policy changes brought about by the 2008 
HEA Reauthorization. At this point, the calculation time for default was changed from two to 
three years, allowing for borrowers who defaulted between year two and three to enter the 
calculations. All things held constant, mathematically it would make sense that default rates 
would rise. It is impossible to isolate its specific effect, however, because there were other policy 
changes happening concurrently. Pell grant awards increased in 2008, decreasing dependency on 
loans for some. Interest rates were also reduced, meaning students at the time would have less 
interest burden upon repayment. These borrowers would enter repayment roughly between 2010 
and 2014, the latter half of this time showing a slight decrease in default rates. Capping loan 
repayment at 15 percent of an individual’s discretionary income logically would decrease default 
rates as well. Again, however, it is difficult to attribute changes to one specific policy. 
Student Loan Debt Effects on Other Economic Markets  
 As discussed before, high student debt burdens and default deter some borrowers from 
having children and making major life purchases, like homes.  
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Purchasing a Home. High levels of debt in general make it difficult to borrow more money for 
purchasing a home, and student loans tend to be the biggest share of debt to many borrowers. 
How student loan debt and default affect house sales in the United States is somewhat 
ambiguous, because there are many other factors affecting house sales, including economic 
conditions and interest rates. Figure 9 compares national default rates with new and existing 
house sales in U.S. from 1987 to 2015. Unsurprisingly, they appear to have countercyclical 
effects.  
The 2012 cohort of the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study from the National 
Center for Education Statistics asks respondents if they delayed buying a home as a result of 
financial costs for undergraduate and graduate education. This survey is comprised of roughly 
19,000 participants. The 2012 follow-up surveyed individuals four years after completing a 
Figure 9 - National Default Rates compared to New and Existing U.S. House Sales, 1987 to 
2015 
Sources: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, National Cohort 
Default Rate; U.S. Census Bureau, New Residential Sales Historic Data, Houses Sold, 1987 to 
2015 
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bachelor’s degree. A one-sample t-test shows evidence (p-value ≈ 0.000) that the average 
response is statistically different from zero. In this sample, nearly 38 percent of respondents 
reported delaying buying a home. Results of all t-tests can be found in Appendix A, alongside a 
description of the data used to calculate them. 
Implications. Lower residential house sales significantly impacts the entire economy, as 
made apparent during the housing crisis of 2008. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, residential investment averages 3-6 percent of GDP. This, however, only includes 
newly built homes. Even still, the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) claims the 
construction of the average new home creates worker income equal to 2.97 new jobs for a year. 
Furthermore, the value of the U.S. housing market was $31.8 trillion in 2017, according to a 
Zillow Report, which is roughly 1.5 times greater than the gross domestic product (“Consumer 
Housing Trends,” 2017). Therefore, because of the size and importance of the housing market, 
there is a multiplicative negative effect on the entire U.S. economy when student loan borrowers 
are unable to purchase homes because of their debt.  
Birth Rates. The relationship between birth rates and default is less apparent because birth rates 
have been declining in recent decades consistently. Figure 10 provides a visual representation of 
national default rates as they are compared to birth rates. Most notably, there is a particular dip in 
birth rates starting in 2008 when the U.S. economy was in the Great Recession. 
 Just under 29 percent of respondents in the 2012 Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal 
Study reported delaying having children due to incurred financial costs from undergraduate and 
graduate education. A one-sample t-test shows evidence (p-value ≈ 0.000) that the average 
response is statistically different from zero.  
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Figure 10 - National Default Rates and U.S. Birth Rates, 1987 to 2015 
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, National Cohort 
Default Rate; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Birth Rates (per 1,000 births), 
1987 to 2015 
Personal Consumption. Although student loan debt is a major source of financial strain for 
many individuals, the Federal Reserve reports it likely has little impact on personal consumption 
across the nation (Fieveson et al., 2018). Not only are there several other factors contributing to 
consumption making it difficult to parse out the effects of student loans, but also education itself 
is generally associated with a positive effect on consumption growth. If anything, individuals 
who receive little value from their higher education are those least likely to add to consumption. 
Figure 11 provides a visual representation of national default rates as they are compared to 
annual change in personal consumption in the United States. There is some, but little, visual 
evidence to see how student loan default is impacting personal consumption. 
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Figure 11 - National Default Rates and Change in Annual Personal Consumption, 1987 to 2015 
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, National Cohort 
Default Rate; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Income and Outlays, Personal 
Consumption Expenditures [PCE], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
1987 to 2015 
Other Consequences of Education Costs. The 2012 Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal 
Study asks other questions regarding the consequences of educational costs as well. Among 
respondents, roughly 29 percent reported accepting a job instead of enrolling in future education. 
Thirty-eight percent reported taking jobs outside their field of study as a result of financial costs 
from undergraduate and graduate education costs. Nearly 22 percent of respondents reported 
delaying marriage and 33 percent reported having worked more hours than desired due to the 
educational costs incurred. Results from t-tests show these averages are statistically different 
from zero (p-value ≈ 0.000 in all cases). 
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Policy Recommendations 
 Upon review of past and current student loan policies and their effectiveness, it is not 
immediately obvious why default rates have varied in the ways they have. Changes in student 
tuition, aid, and enrollment levels all affect debt levels, which in turn relate to default. Natural 
economic fluctuations are also likely associated to default. And of course, federal policies 
surrounding debt and default probably played some kind of role. Still today, student loan debt 
and default is contentious topic amongst students, parents, educators, and lawmakers alike. 
According to a report from the Urban Institute, upwards of 40 percent of borrowers may default 
on student loans by 2023 (Blagg, 2018). A report from The Brookings Institution predicts similar 
increases (Scott-Clayton, 2018). Student loan default is still a problem despite attempts to lessen 
it. The goal of this section, therefore, is to highlight potential policy recommendations and 
avenues for reducing defaults and the consequences of default. 
Use Credit Scores to Target Riskiest Borrowers for Repayment Assistance 
 Federally backed student loans are not subject to an underwriting process (credit check) 
because these tend to exclude low-income borrowers, who generally benefit the most from loans 
for higher education. However, a report from the Urban Institute recommendations using credit 
scores to target the riskiest borrowers, not to eliminate them, but to provide them with additional 
loan counseling services in order to reduce default (Blagg, 2018). They also recommend using 
credit scores to develop new reimbursement incentives for student loan servicers. For example, 
servicers could receive bonuses for ensuring their high-risk borrowers are consistently enrolled 
in an income-driven repayment plan. Similarly, servicers could be awarded bonuses for keeping 
their high-risk borrowers out of default. 
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Allow Institutions to Set Loan Limits for Certain Borrowers 
 Current federal law limits annual loan amounts for the Direct Loan Program based on the 
academic year of the borrower and his or her enrollment status. Such policies can lead many 
student borrowers to take out more debt than necessary, thus increasing the likelihood of future 
financial struggle. This is particularly true for students enrolled in community colleges who 
receive Pell Grants. Often, the grants awarded is enough to cover tuition entirely, and yet some 
students are still offered large sums of student loans. Moreover, students can borrow the same 
amounts regardless of their academic programs—including ones that traditionally lead to jobs 
with limited salary expectations. Institutions are at risk of losing their Direct Loan and Pell Grant 
program eligibilities if their cohort default rate gets too high, and yet they have limited control 
over how much money students can borrow.  
 A report from the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators 
(NASFAA) recommends allowing each institution to set loan limits as they see fit. Under this 
proposal, institutions can impose their own lower limits for specific programs and/or categories 
of students. Then, if students express the desire to borrow additional federal funds, each situation 
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Ideally, such a policy would reduce over-borrowing, 
decrease default rates, and provide institutions with a more efficient and appropriate use of 
professional judgement. 
 Importantly, borrowing would not be limited based on race, sex, color, religion, national 
origin, age, disability status, or any other protected class. 
Strengthen Income-Driven Repayment Options 
 Income-Driven Repayment Plans are typically effective in reducing default among 
borrowers who have low earnings at the beginning of their repayment schedule. Capping 
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monthly payments at 10 or 15 percent of discretionary income reduces the likelihood of having 
unmanageable payments for many borrowers. The problem is, there are currently five income-
driven options, creating a considerable amount of complexity and confusion among borrowers. 
In turn, there is constant push for greater participation in the program. 
 A brief from the University of Pennsylvania suggests enrolling at least some of the 
riskiest borrowers into income-driven repayment options automatically (Perna et al., 2018). The 
major downside to increasing participation in such payment plans is that it may have significant 
costs to taxpayers, as many enrollees pay little to nothing at times. Also, remaining loan balances 
can be forgiven entirely if not paid by the end of the term. Reducing default, however, would 
reduce costs to taxpayers. The overall effect to taxpayers is difficult to predict because of the 
uncertainty in forecasting rates of participation in income-driven repayment plans, overall debt 
levels, borrowers’ future incomes, and interest rates. 
 This report also suggests providing better links between student loan records and the tax 
system. This would reduce the complexity of the current requirement for annual verification of 
income for participants of the program and ensure accuracy in reported income. 
Incorporate Entrance and Exit Counseling into the Department of Education’s Financial 
Awareness Counseling Tool (FACT) 
 Entrance and Exit Counseling is required for all student borrowers as mandated by law, 
and it must contain specific content. How institutions relay this information, however, is up to 
their discretion. Some institutions deliver in-person counseling, but many larger schools resort to 
web-based delivery because it is easier and cheaper.  
 In addition to entrance and exit counseling, the Department of Education offers optional 
Financial Awareness Counseling. This tool offers information on understanding loan types and 
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borrower specific loan debt levels, budget management to compare living expenses and current 
income, plans to repay that predict post-grad incomes and calculate monthly payments for each 
repayment plan, and avoiding default with postponed or reduced payments. This tool, however, 
is not mandatory for student loan borrowers.  
An NASFAA report suggests merging entrance and exit counseling into Financial 
Awareness Counseling, so student borrowers are more apt to understand the complexities and 
responsibilities that come with federal student loans.  
Implement a “Variable-Fixed” Interest Rate System Based on Market Rates 
 Currently, student loan interest rates are set into law so much in advance, they fail to stay 
in touch with current economic conditions and fiscal realities. For example, in 2012, rates for 
Direct Subsidized Stafford Loans were set to double from 3.4 percent to 6.8 percent, which 
greatly exceeded the market rate at the time. This change was set into action several years prior, 
however, as part of the 2007 College Cost Reduction and Access Act.  
 To prevent this from happening again, researchers at NASFAA suggest implementing a 
variable-fixed interest rate system. This means rates vary year to year, based on the total cost to 
the government to lend and service these loans, and then fixed for the life of the loan. Therefore, 
students will face interest rates comparable to market rates in the year they receive the loan. Such 
a policy would create a more stable and predictable interest rate. This would also ensure student 
borrowers are protected from exorbitant interest rates. 
Create a Universal Loan Portal 
 Researchers at NASFAA also suggest creating some kind of universal portal for student 
borrowers would house information regarding all federal, private, and institutional loans. Such a 
portal will be a “one-stop shop” for managing student loans. Many borrowers have multiple loan 
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holders and they are at various stages of repayment. Creating one central hub for all things 
related to student loans will make it easier for borrowers to manage and understand the terms of 
their loans. The information on the site would be kept in real time, allowing borrowers to see 
accrued interest and calculate monthly payments accurately.  
 A central site for all things student loan related will also expand the data collection by the 
National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS), thus promoting further detailed research. 
Conclusion 
 Student loan debt poses unique problems to students, parents, policymakers, taxpayers, 
and the federal government. As mentioned before, the topic can be touchy. The total student loan 
debt burden is growing by the second and has no indication of slowing. Delinquency and default 
continue to be problems for many borrowers and cost a great deal to the government and the 
overall economy annually. Unfortunately, with college prices rising and grant aid failing to keep 
pace, the student loan market is growing more necessary for millions of students in order to 
afford higher education. 
 Delinquency and default are likely results of far more than the type of institution a 
student attends, and yet policies still target institutional characteristics as major factors leading to 
borrower default. Data shows significant fluctuations in national default levels, little of which is 
explained by the Higher Education Act and similar policies. Moreover, student debt and default 
affect more than just individual financial security; there are multiplicative implications of a debt 
burdened society that negatively impacts the economy as a whole. 
 However, current policies are not cutting it. Even with these policies in effect, data shoes 
default rates have once again begun to rise across the nation. Policy recommendations addressing 
some of these problems come from a variety of sources. What happens next is still unknown. It is 
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up to policymakers to ensure borrowers have access to reasonable and safe loans for higher 
education, without letting debt burdens on an individual and national level get further out of 
hand.  
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CHAPTER 2 
WHAT AFFECTS STUDENT LOAN DEFAULT? 
Introduction 
 The first chapter of this paper reviewed past and current policies relating to student loans 
and default, and measured their effectiveness using a series of descriptive analyses. It appears to 
be that current policies are not relating to the root factors contributing to student loan default. 
Delinquency and default result from far more than the institutions in which students attend. In 
turn, this chapter will attempt to evaluate the underlying factors associated with student loan 
default especially those not currently addressed by federal or state policies.  
 Student loan delinquency and default costs the federal government a tremendous amount 
each year. For such reasons, public scrutiny has called for greater government accountability in 
the higher education market. The public sometimes blames the institutions themselves for 
soaring default rates, even though defaults occur after students leave the institutions. These 
beliefs are supported by federal policies that punish the institutions themselves for having default 
rates above a certain level.  
Student loan default rates are traditionally evaluated from one of four perspectives: 
sociological, psychological, economic, and federal. Each perspective examines student loan debt 
and default through a unique lens. Sociological perspectives evaluate student loan default as 
though dependent on institutional fit. That is, models measure students’ values, behaviors, and 
interests and see how they measure up with peers and faculty at their respective institutions. This 
perspective relies on the fact that students are more likely to persist and graduate when their 
values are aligned with the values of the institution. Failing to make payments among borrowers 
who have sufficient income is characterized as an act of deviance (Christman, 2000). 
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 Psychological perspectives explain student loan default rather differently. Attitude 
formation theories suggest borrowers are particularly susceptible to peer and professional 
influence during critical loan borrowing times. That is, if fellow students and academic 
professionals are seen as credible, student borrowers form attitudes positively associating their 
collegiate satisfaction with money borrowed to pay for schooling (Flint, 1997). 
Federal perspectives explain student loan default rates as general fault of the institutions 
in which they attended. This is consistent with the federal government’s policy of holding 
institutions responsible of repayment behavior of their former students. 
This paper, however, will heavily rely on the economic perspectives and how they 
associate with higher education enrollment and student loan default. Human capital theory helps 
with this. This theory states that students will make decisions regarding investment, generally 
financial, in higher education with the expectation that they will gain human capital, thus 
securing future returns that will outweigh both implicit and explicit costs. Empirical analyses by 
Mincer (1974) and others following have demonstrated future earnings are predicted to grow 
with additional education. Human capital theory does a good job at explaining why students 
choose to enroll in higher education. 
Closely related is the theory of public subsidies. Higher education is subsidized with state 
and federal grants for neediest of students. This allows them to attain the benefits of higher 
education so that they still outweigh the costs (Cabrera et al., 1990). Such subsidies also ensure 
equal educational opportunity among all socioeconomic statuses. The subsidies are returned to 
society in the form of a better educated workforce. Additionally, higher income individuals 
contribute a greater amount in tax revenues and student loan interest payments. Volkwein et al. 
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(1998) argues students who do not graduate are less likely to receive higher earnings and thus 
more likely to default on their loan obligations. 
One other economic theory likely relating to default is the “ability-to-pay” theory. The 
idea behind this theory is that borrowers have enough income to pay for housing, food, medical 
expenses, transportation, and then student loans with leftover discretionary income. When 
borrowers do not have sufficient discretionary income left over, they can turn to family or friends 
for financial support. Essentially, they find the ability-to-pay. For many student loan borrowers, 
however, relying on family and friends for financial assistance is improbable if not impossible.  
 Altogether, there are a multitude of potential explanations as to why student loan 
borrowers default. This paper will continue to investigate factors likely associated with default in 
attempts to ascertain whether economic perspectives can be backed up by data. Specifically, is 
default a function of student and family characteristics, as opposed to characteristics of the 
institutions they attend? Similarly, how much impact do post-college success variables have on 
default rates? 
Literature Review 
During discussions of reauthorization of the HEA in 1998, default rates were at the center 
of attention. Research showed rates of delinquency and default likely correlated with quality of 
institution (Gross et al., 2009). Instead of addressing the specific institutions, however, 
policymakers increased the time limit in which loans become in default, from 180 to 270 days. 
Ten years later, the default calculation window was changed to three years allowing for more 
detailed analysis of changes over time. As a result, Lederman (2008) projected default rates by 
sector and level of U.S. higher education institutions. Results show default rates highest among 
2-year institutions, public institutions, and private for-profit institutions, and go as high as 27 
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percent. This conclusion reiterates prior research that singles out students from less-than-two-
year, proprietary, or community colleges for having higher default rates than students who went 
to four-year and/or more selective institutions, even after controlling for individual standardized 
test scores (Podgursky et al., 2002).  
Further research, however, has concluded these institutional effects largely disappear 
when controlling for specific student-level characteristics (Christman, 2000; Emmert, 1978; 
Flint, 1997; Gray, 1985; Greene, 1989; Hakim & Rashidian, 1995; Herr & Burt, 2005; Houle, 
2013; Looney & Yannelis, 2015; Volkwein & Szelest, 1995). That is, most differences in default 
rates are related to the kinds of students choosing to attend these institutions, not the institutions 
themselves. Therefore, some institutions become “high-risk” for defaults, given their population. 
Emmert (1978) suggests further research should consider weighing demographic factors for 
institutions, as to highlight actual institutional characteristics impacting default rates. Volkwein 
and Szelest (1995) find results to back institutional investment and instructional support because 
wealthier institutions can provide greater access to social and economic capital for their students, 
thus decreasing chances of default.  
Institutional Characteristics 
Including institutional control variables is still important, as significant correlations have 
been drawn between types of institutions and default rates. For example, many studies have 
found borrowers who attended for-profit and public two-year institutions (community colleges) 
were at the greatest risk of becoming delinquent or defaulting on student loans (Cunningham & 
Kienzl, 2011; Dervarics, 2009, Dillon & Carey, 2009; Ginsberg & Ginsberg, 1989; Gross et al., 
2009; Harrison, 1995; Jaquette & Hillman, 2015; Looney & Yannelis, 2015; Woo, 2002). 
Ginsberg & Ginsberg (1989) points to a case study that finds more than 60 percent of all 
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Californian students who default had attended trade schools or community colleges. Notably, 
community college default rates are significantly above average, despite the fact their students 
have lower rates of borrowing (Dervarics, 2009). One explanation to this inconsistency is that 
students can take out loans that greatly exceed the cost of tuition and fees because colleges have 
no control over federal policy. Rates were also higher among borrowers who attended 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities and urban institutions (Gross et al., 2009). 
 Ishitani & McKitrick (2016) argue default is mostly related to institutional capacity. They 
observe the highest cohort default rates among institutions with high proportions of minority 
students, low admission test score averages, low retention rates, and low instructional expenses. 
Many of these factors, however, are simply aggregated forms of student-level characteristics. 
Webber & Rogers (2014) find institutional variables such as admissions yield, geographic 
region, percent of minority students, institution control (private versus public), endowment, and 
expenditures for student services all significant in predicting cohort default rates. The size of the 
student body at an institution is thought to be correlated with default rates, but no evidence is 
found to support this (Knapp & Seaks, 2002). 
It is possible that the likelihood of borrowing at all is related to institutional 
characteristics. Freshmen who start at four-year colleges and expect to attain a bachelor’s degree 
are more likely to borrow than the overall cohort. Those who start at two-year colleges are less 
likely to borrow. Additionally, a high percentage of students who start at private, for-profit, less-
than-four-year institutions borrow money to finance their education (Gladieux & Perna, 2005). 
Background Characteristics of Borrowers 
 Background characteristics of borrowers refers to mostly demographic variables such as 
age, race, gender, location, as well as familial socioeconomic status, and academic preparedness. 
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Age. A borrower’s age has been found significant in predicting the likelihood of default in a 
handful of studies (Christman, 2000; Cunningham & Kienzl, 2011; Emmert, 1978; Flint, 1997; 
Podgursky et al., 2002). According to one study, for each year past the age of 21, the likelihood 
of defaulting on student loans increases by 3 percent (Flint, 1997). Older students are less likely 
to be dependent on friends and family for support when they are experiencing financial 
difficulties (Woo, 2002). They also likely have significantly more financial responsibilities such 
as credit cards, mortgage loans, auto loans, and dependent children (Harrast, 2004; Herr & Bert, 
2005) and therefore more likely to struggle with repayment (Choy & Li, 2006).  
Gender. Binary gender analysis by Hakim & Rashidian (1995) shows women are more likely to 
default than men. This may be related to the fact that many households of low socioeconomic 
status are composed of a single, female parent. Additionally, the asymmetry of wages between 
gender explains why women may be under more financial stress. Conversely, several other 
studies find being female actually decreases chances of default (Flint, 1997; Herr & Bert, 2005; 
Podgursky et al., 2002; Woo, 2002). Other studies find no significant links between gender and 
default rates (Christman, 2000; Knapp & Seaks, 2002; Volkwein & Szelest, 1995). 
Ethnicity. All students of color are at greater risk of default than their white counterparts 
(Christman, 2000; Harrast, 2004; Volkwein and Cabrera, 1998), with black and Native American 
individuals being of greatest risk (Herr & Bert, 2005; Greene, 1989; Knapp & Seaks, 1992; 
Podgursky et al., 2002; Steiner and Teszler, 2003; Volkwein et al., 1998). These results are 
consistent even when controlling for post-graduate earnings (Boyd, 1997) and institution type 
(Dynarski, 1994). Some of this may be a result of greater debt burdens upon graduation, as well 
as greater unemployment rates (Gross et al., 2010).  
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Of the studies that include race/ethnicity as factors, only one finds no statistically 
significant results to suggest race is important in predicting default (Hakim & Rashidian, 1995). 
Family Background and Income. As mentioned before, many borrowers rely on support from 
family if they ever become in financial distress. Several studies find low family income is 
significantly associated with higher default (Christman, 2000; Ginsberg & Ginsberg, 1989; Gross 
et al., 2010; Hakim & Rashidian, 1995; Looney & Yannelis, 2015; Volkwein et al., 1998; Wilms 
et al., 1987). Moreover, students from middle-income families are likely to require the most 
loans to finance higher education, thus increasing their debt burden and making repayment more 
difficult (Christman, 2000; Houle, 2013). Specifically, Knapp & Seaks (1992) find an increase in 
parental income by ten thousand dollars decreases the chance of default by two percent. This is 
largely because family income is more predictive of entry into debt. That is, young adults from 
low-income households are more likely to accrue debt higher than the national average (Choy & 
Li, 2006; Houle, 2013). 
Family background variables lowering default rates include being of Asian or White 
decent, and parent(s) are college-educated (Houle, 2013; Volkwein et al., 1998). Family 
background characteristics that probably increase default include being of African American or 
American Indian decent, parents have little education, having a GED or no high school diploma 
(Volkwein et al., 1998), and having a large family size and more dependent children (Hakim & 
Rashidian, 1995). The presence of both parents in the home is correlated with lower chances of 
default (Knapp & Seaks, 1992). Additionally, independent students are more likely to borrow for 
the funding of higher education (Christman, 2000; Choy & Li, 2006). 
Academic Preparedness. Borrowers who performed well in high school are less likely to 
default. High school academic rank is predictive of repayment. Students at Texas A&M in the 
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25th percentile or below defaulted 12.8 percent of the time, while students from the 90th 
percentile only defaulted 3.2 percent of the time (Steiner & Teszler, 2003). Higher SAT scores 
(Steiner & Teszler, 2003) and higher ACT scores (Christman, 2000) are also predictive of 
repayment. Students with a GED versus a traditional high school diploma are more likely to 
default as well (Christman, 2000). 
College Experience Variables 
 A student’s attitude and activity during college can be predictive of how he or she will 
perform financially after graduation. 
Major/Field of Study. Individual academic decision-making such as majoring in the science, 
technology, engineering, and math (STEM) field is correlated with lower rates of default 
(Volkwein and Szelest, 1995). The more a borrower changes majors during the course of his or 
her academic career is positively predictive of default (Steiner & Teszler, 2003) while borrowers 
with a second major are less likely to default (Steiner & Teszler, 2003). However, differences in 
default rates between majors largely disappear when controlling for post-graduate income 
(Lochner & Monge-Naranjo, 2003). Additionally, the greater the misalignment of college major 
and post-graduate employment, the larger chances a borrower will default (Flint, 1997). 
Attendance. The more credits a student accumulates, the less likely he or she will default 
(Steiner & Teszler, 2003). Additionally, the longer a student is enrolled in higher education 
generally leads to lower default rates (Steiner & Teszler, 2003). This trend reverses when a 
student has six or more years between the time of initial enrollment and beginning of repayment, 
even when college completion and success is controlled for (Steiner & Teszler, 2003). Part time 
attendance is correlated with higher default rates, but this tied to the fact that part-time 
enrollment increases the likelihood of not completing education (Gladieux & Perna, 2005). 
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Student Employment. Working while enrolled in school can help students pay for college, thus 
requiring fewer loans. Volkwein et al. (1998) found a small decrease in default rates among non-
White students who worked during college but found no change among White borrowers. 
However, working full time, or nearly full time, is correlated with non-completion and therefore 
likely increases rates of default (Gladieux & Perna, 2005). 
Exit Counseling. Although federal loan exit counseling is required for all borrowers, many 
institutions have made their own counseling systems because it helps students understand 
repayment responsibilities, thus decreasing default rates (Adams, 2011). Steiner and Teszler 
(2003) found significantly lower rates of default among Texas A&M students who received in-
person exit counseling versus those who did not. This may be confounding, however, because 
students who graduate are more likely to receive in-person exit counseling. Conversely, Flint 
(1997), a study with a larger and more diverse sample, finds no evidence to support any 
correlations between exit counseling and default rates. 
Other Experience Variables. Some studies found students who spent more time living in dorms 
on campus had lower default rates (Emmert, 1978; Steiner & Teslzer, 2003). Steiner & Teslzer 
(2003) hypothesized this was because students living on campus are more greatly associated with 
the institution, which is associated with success and therefore repayment. 
 Borrowers who attended any kind of professional or graduate school are less likely to 
default despite the fact that they generally incur more debt and take longer to begin earning 
money (Woo, 2002). This is likely because higher education individuals have more success in 
the job market. 
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College Success Variables 
 It is not exactly obvious why college success is correlated with default behavior. It is 
possible that students learn hard work and responsibility and therefore will be more accountable 
when it comes to repayment of student loans. This may be true, particularly because the 
correlations are still significant when models control for higher positions in the job market and 
higher incomes (Steiner & Teslzer, 2003). If college success merely opens up employment 
opportunities and raises earnings, degree completion policies would lower institutional default 
rates. However, it may be that students’ persistence to graduate transfers into persistence to repay 
loans (Knapp & Seaks, 1992). 
Graduation. Degree completion plays a significant, if not the greatest, role in decreasing default 
rates according to several studies (Gladieux & Perna, 2005; Herr & Bert, 2005; Podgursky et al., 
2002; Volkwein and Szelest, 1995; Volkwein et al., 1998; Wilms et al., 1987; Woo, 2002). 
These correlations hold true regardless of the type of degree earned (Steiner & Teslzer, 2003). 
Volkwein et al. (1998) finds earning a degree greatly outweighs institutional influences on 
default, and said impacts are the greatest among African American borrowers. There may be 
confounding factors to consider, because poor academic performance likely affects degree 
completion as well as default behavior (Volkwein & Cabrera, 1998).  
Grade Point Average. Grade point average (GPA) is found to be positively correlated with 
repayment and negatively with default in a handful of studies (Christman, 2000; Flint, 1997; 
Steiner & Teszler, 2003; Volkwein et al., 1998; Woo, 2002). Specifically, Flint (1997) studied a 
variety of student academic characteristics and only found GPA to be significant. Some 
researchers have speculated GPA is merely a proxy for student ability and motivation, which are 
inherently related to success measures in the future (Volkwein & Szelest, 1995). 
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Continuous Enrollment. Podgursky et al. (2002) finds evidence to support the benefits of 
continuous enrollment. Students who did not have gaps in their education were far less likely to 
default on their loans. Even students who did not graduate but continuously enrolled had 
pointedly lower chances of defaulting. Steiner & Teszler (2003) find default probability rises 
with the number of times a student withdraws temporarily, and students who withdraw for 
academic or administrative reasons are more likely to default than students who withdraw for 
work-related reasons.  
Credit Hours Earned/Failed. Two studies found failing and/or retaking courses during a 
student’s academic career is associated with higher rates of default (Christman, 2000; Steiner & 
Teszler, 2003). Similarly, taking one or more remedial course likely affects completion and 
default rates (Gladieux & Perna, 2005). Thein & Herr (2001) conclude the number of credit 
hours failed accounts for 21 percent of the variation in default behavior. Gray (1985) concludes 
the number of credits hours taken is highly predictive of repayment.  
Post-College Variables 
 Student loan borrowers most often do not begin repayment until they have graduated or 
left college for an extended period of time. It is therefore vital to consider factors affecting 
individual financial stability during these times, as well at the financial stability of the economy 
as a whole. 
Unemployment. Periods of unemployment usually leave individuals without sufficient income 
to pay for all regular necessities, let alone student loans. An individual’s unemployment status is 
correlated with a higher probability of going into default (Dynarski, 1994; Emmert, 1978; 
Looney & Yannelis, 2015; Woo, 2002). Similarly, national unemployment is the primary 
economic reason behind high cohort default rates (Hakim & Rashidian, 1995; Ishitani & 
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McKitrick, 2016). Surveyed individuals (59 percent) report being unemployed is the most 
important reason they defaulted (Volkwein et al., 1998). 
Income. Perhaps the most researched variable is how an individual’s income affects their ability 
to repay student loans. Higher individual earnings are correlated with lower default rates because 
these individuals are less likely to miss payments (Boyd, 1997; Christman, 2000; Dervarics, 
2009; Dynarski, 1994; Flint, 1997; Ginsberg & Ginsberg, 1989; Hakim & Rashidian, 1995; King 
& Bannon, 2002; Lochner & Monge-Naranjo, 2003; Looney & Yannelis, 2015; Volkwein et al., 
1998). Some 69 percent of surveyed individuals reported being employed but still having 
insufficient funds to pay for student loans (Dynarski, 1994). Although low incomes increase 
default risk, there are some individuals who have sufficient disposable incomes and still choose 
not to repay student loans. Flint (1997) found 11.6 percent of borrowers who had disposable 
incomes greater than total amount borrowed ended up defaulting. Moreover, 83 percent who did 
not have disposable incomes greater than the amount borrowed were actively in repayment. This 
suggests student loan default is related to far more than just financial factors. 
Personal and Family Arrangements. Several studies suggest a borrower’s marital status can 
affect student loan default (Christman, 2000; Gray, 1985; Volkwein at al., 1998). Specifically, 
Volkwein & Szelest (1995) suggest being separated, divorced, or widowed increases default risk 
by 7 percent. Conversely, Hakim & Rashidian (1995) does not find marital status to be 
significant in predicting default.  
Having dependent children can lead to significant financial distress on an individual or 
household, and thus may impact the repayment of student loans (Christman, 2000). Not having 
dependent children substantially increase the likelihood of repayment and lower the likelihood of 
default (Volkwein & Szelest, 1995; Volkwein et al., 1998). Having dependent children combined 
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with being single, separated, divorced, or widowed produces default rates above 40 percent 
(Volkwein et al. 1998). 
Knowledge of Repayment Obligation. Having knowledge about repayment obligations and 
policies will impact whether or not you will repay loans. Volkwein at al. (1998) finds one in four 
borrowers are confused by the repayment process and policies, and three out of four were not 
aware of deferment options, which can help borrowers avoid default during times of financial 
stress. 
Non-educational Debts and Other Costs. Larger non-educational debts and other monthly 
costs, such as housing, are correlated with higher default rates (Christman, 2000; Gray, 1985). 
Debt and Repayment-related Variables 
 Simply put, the more educational debt an individual has, the larger the monthly payments 
will be, thus a higher potential risk for financial stress, delinquency, and/or default on such loans. 
The same total debt for two individuals likely impacts them differently, however, because they 
are prone to have different types of loans, interest rates, repayment plans, perceptions of debt, 
etc.  
Cumulative Educational Debt. The cumulative indebtedness of student loan borrowers in the 
United States has increased a great deal in the last two decades (Cunningham & Kienzl, 2011; 
Dillon & Carey, 2009; Houle, 2013). Increasing total educational debts is highly predictive of 
default (Gray, 1985; King & Bannon, 2002; Lochner & Monge-Naranjo, 2003; Webber & 
Rogers, 2014). However, some research argues having more debt is indicative of more schooling 
and thus more success and so debt is positively correlated with repayment (Volkwein et al., 
1998; Woo, 2002). On the opposite end, borrowers with loan debt totals below $5,000 are most 
likely to default, because such low amounts of debt are indicators of non-completion (Steiner & 
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Teszler, 2003), and the decision to incur additional debt by a borrower who is already in school 
is not as consequential as the initial decision to borrow in the first place (Woo, 2002). Baum & 
O’Malley (2003) report the total debt level matters less than the average payment-to-income 
ratios, because that is more indicative of financial stress. 
Perceptions of Debt. The way students perceive their college opportunities and financial aid will 
probably affect their borrowing and repayment decisions (Dowd, 2008). That is, there is 
imperfect information about the future when students decide to take on student debt, so how 
knowledgeable they are about the financial options likely affects decisions. In some research, 
surveys have found borrowers express extreme discontent towards the debt they accrued to 
finance their education because previous generations did not face the same financial obstacles for 
a college degree (Cofer and Somers, 1999). Similarly, the 2002 National Student Loan Survey 
reports Pell recipients overwhelmingly chose to discontinue higher education because of 
compounding student loan debt (Baum & O’Malley, 2003). 
Loan Servicing. Some research finds having more than one loan servicer increases the risk of 
default (Flint, 1997; Woo, 2002). Moreover, the number of loans—instead of the amount—is 
more suggestive of default (Woo, 2002). The gap between maximum federal loan amounts and 
unmet need has continued to widen since 2000, making more students resorting to the riskiest 
kind of student debt, unregulated private loans, which are usually accompanied by large interest 
rates (Dillon & Carey, 2009). Otherwise, there is little specific research done regarding how 
characteristics of the loans themselves impact default rates. The extent to which interest rates 
have affected default rates is practically unresearched. Steiner and Teszler (2003), however, find 
little reason to believe the type of loans and loan consolidation has any effect on default rates. 
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Data and Methodology 
 Data for this research is from Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study 
(BPS) as part of the National Center for Education Statistics. This survey starts with students 
who are enrolled in their first year of postsecondary education and follows them for six years. 
More specifically, participants are asked about familial backgrounds and demographics, 
undergraduate experiences, persistence and completion of postsecondary education, incomes, 
employment history, student loans and repayment, entrance into graduate school, and more. 
 BPS gets its cohort of participants from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study 
(NPSAS). Participants are representative of first-year students of all majors. The most recent 
cohort were initially surveyed in the 2003-04 academic year. Participants then received follow-
up surveys at the end of their third (2006) and sixth (2009) years after entry into postsecondary 
education. This dataset include observations for some 16,700 students. 
 For an analysis of student loan repayment, the most relevant part of this survey is the 
2009 follow up. By this time, a significant number of participants have left school and reached a 
point in which they would traditionally begin repayment. Literature often sites graduation as the 
leading determinant of default, so this will be a primary focus of this investigation. 
 This sample of data is assumed to be fully representative of the population, and therefore 
inferences from analysis will be assumed to hold true for the population as well as this specific 
sample. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 5 outlines descriptive statistics for the sample being used for analysis.  
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Table 5 - Descriptive statistics for the sample 
Categorical Variables N (rounded to 
nearest 10) 
Percentage 
First degree type attained through 2009 
 No degree 7,240 43.39% 
 Certificate 1,710 10.25% 
 Associate’s Degree 1,890 11.32% 
 Bachelor’s Degree 5,850 35.03% 
Federal student loan repayment status in 2009 
 No federal loans 7,150 42.88% 
 Loans paid in full or cancelled 1,030 6.18% 
 In repayment 5,390 32.28% 
 Deferred/forbearance 1,120 6.73% 
 In default 570 3.43% 
 Not in repayment 1,420 8.49% 
Sector of Institution 
 Public 4 year 4,580 27.45% 
 Private nonprofit 4 year 5,570 33.40% 
 Private for-profit 4 year 430 2.57% 
 Public 2 year 3,690 22.09% 
 Private nonprofit 2 year 370 2.23% 
 Private for-profit 2 year 70 0.43% 
 Public less than 2 year 380 2.26% 
 Private nonprofit less than 2 year 530 3.15% 
 Private for-profit less than 2 year 1,070 6.43% 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
 No 16,330 97.88% 
 Yes 350 2.12% 
Hispanic Serving Institutions 
 No 15,490 92.83% 
 Yes 1,200 7.17% 
Dependency status 2003-04 
 Dependent 12,880 77.19% 
 Independent 3,810 22.81% 
College major (general) 
 Undeclared 2,390 14.33% 
 Humanities 1,920 11.53% 
 Social sciences 1,680 10.08% 
 Life sciences 880 5.25% 
 Physical sciences 210 1.24% 
 Mathematics 100 0.61% 
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 Computer science 570 3.40% 
 Engineering/engineering technology 720 4.29% 
 Education 1,090 6.56% 
 Business 2,600 15.58% 
 Health 2,100 12.59% 
 Vocational/technical 830 4.98% 
 Other technical/professional 1,600 9.57% 
Gender 
 Male 6,880 41.21% 
 Female 9,810 58.79% 
Race 
 White 10,740 64.36% 
 Black or African American 2,200 13.19% 
 Hispanic or Latino 2,110 12.66% 
 Asian 770 4.63% 
 American Indian or Alaskan Native 120 0.70% 
 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 50 0.29% 
 Other 230 1.37% 
 More than one race 470 2.27% 
Marital status in 2009 
 Single, never married 11,410 68.37% 
 Married 4,050 24.25% 
 Separated, divorced, or widowed 1,230 7.38% 
Unemployed 3 months or more since graduation in 2009 
 No 8,570 74.12% 
 Yes 2,990 25.88% 
Student employment 
 No 5,630 33.73% 
 Yes 11,060 66.27% 
High School GPA 
 0.5 – 0.9 (D- to D) 20 0.18% 
 1.0 – 1.4 (D to C-) 80 0.62% 
 1.5 – 1.9 (C- to C) 350 2.67% 
 2.0 – 2.4 (C to B-) 1,480 11.31% 
 2.5 – 2.9 (B- to B) 1,770 13.54% 
 3.0 – 3.4 (B to A-) 4,490 34.40% 
 3.5 – 4.0 (A- to A) 4,870 37.28% 
Postsecondary GPA 
 3.75 – 4.0 (mostly A’s) 3,310 19.86% 
 3.25 – 3.74 (A’s and B’s) 5,800 34.77% 
 2.75 – 3.24 (mostly B’s) 3,750 22.45% 
 2.25 – 2.74 (B’s and C’s) 2,450 14.70% 
 1.75 – 2.24 (mostly C’s) 750 4.48% 
 1.25 – 1.74 (C’s and D’s) 280 1.67% 
 0.00 – 1.24 (mostly D’s or below) 350 2.07% 
Table 5 cont. 
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Continuous Variables N (rounded to 
nearest 10) 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Cumulative total student loan amount 
owed in 2009 (excluding non-borrowers) 
9,110 $18,167 $17,376 
Monthly student loan repayment in 2009 5,230 $201 $203 
Annual income in 20093 9,430 $32,195 $17,637 
Number of dependents in 2009 16,680 0.55 1.04 
Monthly mortgage or rent in 2009 10,490 $700 $437 
Balance due on all credit cards in 2009 16,680 $1,386 $3782 
Monthly car payment in 2009 16,680 $127 $190 
Dependent students’ parents’ income 12,880 $68,714 $54,029 
Age in 2003-04 16,680 21.2 6.9 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Model #1. The dependent variable in the first model is whether or not the individual defaulted. 
Due to its dichotomous nature, a probit model will be used. Borrowers who defaulted are 
denoted by 𝑦 = 1, while borrowers who did not default are denoted by 𝑦 = 0. The standard 
model is as follows: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦 = 1) = Φ(𝑿′𝜷) 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦 = 0) = 1 − Φ(𝑿′𝜷) 
where Φ denotes cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, X denotes a 
vector of explanatory variables, and 𝜷 is a vector of parameters. The errors are normally 
distributed. The maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of 𝜷 are consistent, asymptotically normal 
and efficient. The marginal effects of the probability of default with respect to her jth independent 
variable is given by 
𝜕𝐸(𝑦)
𝜕𝑿𝑗
= Φ(𝑿′𝜷)𝜷𝑗.  
A number of different specifications of X will be tested in order to evaluate the 
significance of each factor in question. Firstly, X will be comprised of only institutional 
                                                 
3 This value does not include imputed values of annual income. It only includes values directly reported to the BPS 
survey.  
Table 5 cont. 
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characteristics. These include level and control, and whether or not the institution is an HBCU or 
Hispanic Serving Institution. As mentioned before, specific types of institutions lend themselves 
to higher default rates overall. These results should reiterate this point. A second specification 
will include borrower level characteristics as well. This will help explain how institutions 
themselves affect default, or if student characteristics are more important in explaining these 
outcomes. These variables will include demographics and family background, college experience 
factors, college success factors, post-college factors, and factors related to debt levels and 
repayment. 
Variable Specification. Variables to be included in this model are chosen based on 
previous literature, economic theory, and descriptive statistical analysis. Whether or not the 
borrower defaulted is the dependent variable. Notably, observations that are not reported as 
defaulted in 2009 include non-borrowers. This eliminates potential selection bias for students 
who elect not to borrow any money for higher education. As expected, observations who did not 
borrow will report zero for monthly repayment and cumulative debt variables. 
As mentioned before, the sector of the institution and HBCU and Hispanic Serving 
Institution indicators will be included in both specifications of this model. 
Perhaps most importantly, the model will include the highest degree earned of the 
individual. Not only does this measure completion of higher education, but also explains the 
level of education (i.e. Certificate, Associates, Bachelor’s, or no degree). Previous literature has 
repeatedly shown completion is the driving force behind a borrower’s ability to pay for student 
loans. This analysis will go a step further and examine the effects of specific degree levels. 
Predictably, the more education an individual receives, the higher income they will have post-
graduation. Additionally, completion of higher education may indicate underlying motivation, 
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ability, and responsibility. These likely positively impact an individual’s incentive to pay off 
educational debts.  
 Previous research has found a significant relationship between family background and 
default likelihood of a borrower. For that reason, the model will include parents’ income if the 
student is dependent. 
 The income of the individual as well as the amount of monthly student loan payments are 
particularly pertinent to this analysis. Economic theory supports the inclusion of income because 
the less income an individual has, the more likely they are facing financial strain when paying 
for living necessities and student loans. Unfortunately, there are significant gaps in income data 
from the BPS survey. Due to their systematic nature, it is inappropriate to drop observations that 
are missing this key factor. In turn, annual income is imputed using a multiple imputation 
regression method where income is dependent on factors such as age, gender, race, education 
level, GPA, field of study, periods of unemployment, and hours worked per week. The decision 
to include each of these factors into the imputation were made based on availability of other data 
and significance of an OLS regression with income as the dependent variable. Results from this 
regression can be found in Appendix B. 
This model will specify the monthly payment amount as opposed to cumulative debt 
level because monthly payments can vary greatly depending on the interest rates, payment plans, 
and income of the individual. For example, there is potential for an individual to have a high 
total debt burden but a small monthly payment if he or she has a low annual income and is 
paying through an income-driven repayment plan. In turn, the greater the monthly payment 
amount, the more likely the individual will face similar financial strain to make such payments. 
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Along the same line, the number of dependents an individual has will be included 
because the more dependents, the more costly it is to maintain a functional household. Similarly, 
other expenses such as monthly mortgage/rent, car payments, and monthly credit card payments 
are to be included for the same reason. The greater other expenses an individual has, the more 
financial strain they are likely to face when paying student loans. 
 Gender, race, marital status, and age are included mostly as control variables. Previous 
literature has found significance in including some or all of these factors in analysis. The impact 
of such factors generally depends on which other explanatory variables are included in the 
model, however. Specifically, marital status is assumed to control for spousal income and 
spousal expenses, which may both directly affect an individual’s ability to repay student loans. 
This dataset includes this information but suffers from a great deal of missing observations. In 
order to include spousal income and debt in the model, the number of observations would 
decrease severely and detract from the variation of other explanatory variables. In turn, they are 
excluded and assumed to be controlled for with the marital status variable. 
 This dataset reports whether or not an individual has been unemployed for 3 months or 
more at any given time. This is beneficial to the model specification because being unemployed 
implies the individual is not making a regular income, which makes paying debt payments more 
difficult. 
  Finally, high school and postsecondary GPAs, as well as student employment are 
included, as recommended by previous literature. The more prepared a student is upon entering 
higher education (i.e. higher high school GPA), the more likely they will succeed in college and 
perform well in the workforce after school. Much like college completion, a better academic 
record may be indication of motivation, ability, and responsibility, which may affect repayment. 
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Student employment may also be indicative of responsibility. 
Model #2. A second probit model will be run to examine the effects of college major/field of 
study on default. As mentioned before, the newest proposal for reauthorization of the Higher 
Education Act (PROSPER Act) plans to target specific academic programs for having high rates 
of default. This analysis will attempt to determine the validity and usefulness of such a policy. 
The dependent variable will still be whether or not the individual defaulted. The first 
specification of X will be college major only. The second specification of X will also include 
variables from the first model as controls. 
 A list of variable names used from the BPS survey in both models are listed in Appendix 
C for reference. 
Results 
 Table 6 below illustrates the average marginal effects for each model specification. In 
each specification, whether or not the individual borrower defaulted on any federal student loans 
is the dependent variable. The average marginal effects describe how much the (conditional) 
probability of the outcome variable (whether or not the borrower defaults) changes when there is 
a marginal change the value of a regressor, on average, holding all other regressors constant. 
Average marginal effects are used instead of 𝜷 estimates because these are normalized and 
inflated by an unknown 𝝈. 
 Appendix D and E contain the complete Stata code (do-files) for the cleaning and 
analysis of this data for reference. Missing data decreases the sample size from the full sample of 
16,680 observations for the second specification of each model. To maintain consistency across 
models, the same sample of 5,370 observations is used for each specification. The first 
specification of both Model #1 and Model #2 with all observations available are in Appendix F. 
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Table 6 - Regression results 
 Model #1 Model #2 
Dependent Variable Whether or not the borrower defaulted 
Number of Observations 5,370 5,370 5,370 5,370 
R-squared 0.0697 0.2589 0.0287 0.2796 
Sector (compared to Public 4 
year) 
 
 Private nonprofit 4 year 0.0049 
(0.0042) 
 -0.0108** 
(0.0051) 
- -0.0107** 
(0.0052) 
 Private for-profit 4 year not estimable not estimable - not estimable 
 Public 2 year 0.0016 
(0.0042) 
0.0048 
(0.0076) 
- 0.0033 
(0.0073) 
 Private nonprofit 2 year 0.0139* 
(0.1098) 
0.0032 
(0.0126) 
- -0.0003 
(0.0115) 
 Private for-profit 2 year 0.1749 
(0.1182) 
0.0455 
(0.0456) 
- 0.0409 
(0.0415) 
 Public less than 2 year 0.0255 
(0.0194) 
-0.0065 
(0.0100) 
- -0.0044 
(0.0108) 
 Private nonprofit less than 2 
year 
0.0991*** 
(0.0292) 
0.0360** 
(0.0162) 
- 0.0340** 
(0.0160) 
 Private for-profit less than 2 
year 
0.0819*** 
(0.0208 
0.0124 
(0.0110) 
- 0.0128 
(0.0108) 
HBCU indicator 0.0285** 
(0.0119) 
0.0053 
(0.0110) 
- 0.0048 
(0.0104) 
Hispanic Serving Institution 
indicator 
0.0083 
(0.0071) 
-0.0032 
(0.0069) 
- -0.0031 
(0.0067) 
Highest degree (compared to an 
individual with no degree) 
 
 Certificate - -0.0059 
(0.0102) 
- -0.0006 
(0.0111) 
 Associate degree - -0.0328*** 
(0.0065) 
- -0.0306*** 
(0.0072) 
 Bachelor’s Degree - -0.0393*** 
(0.0051) 
- -0.0397*** 
(0.0050) 
Monthly repayment amount - 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
- 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Annual income - -0.0000 
(0.0000) 
- -0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Other expenditures - -0.0000* 
(0.0000) 
- -0.0000* 
(0.0000) 
Dependent student’s parents’ 
income 
- -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
- -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
Age - -0.0013 
(0.0019) 
- -0.0012 
(0.0019) 
Gender (male) - 0.0006 
(0.0039) 
- -0.0024 
(0.0039) 
Race (compared to white)  
 Black or African American - 0.0072 
(0.0060) 
- 0.0078 
(0.0059) 
 Hispanic or Latino - 0.0095 
(0.0061) 
- 0.0103* 
(0.0060) 
 Asian - 0.0018 
(0.0106) 
- 0.0034 
(0.0106) 
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 American Indian or Alaska 
Native 
- 0.0117 
(0.0200) 
- 0.0103 
(0.0185) 
 Native Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander 
- not estimable - not estimable 
 Other - not estimable - not estimable 
 More than one race  0.0401** 
(0.0181) 
 0.0417** 
(0.0184) 
Married - -0.0030 
(0.0044) 
- -0.0034 
(0.0043) 
Number of dependents - 0.0027 
(0.0022) 
- 0.0030 
(0.0012) 
Unemployed 3 months or more - 0.0084** 
(0.0041) 
- 0.0082** 
(0.0040) 
Postsecondary GPA - -0.0023** 
(0.0011) 
- -0.0022* 
(0.0011) 
High School GPA - -0.0020 
(0.0016) 
- -0.0022 
(0.0016) 
Student employment - 0.0061 
(0.0044) 
- 0.0072* 
(0.0044) 
College major (general) 
(compared to undeclared) 
 
 Humanities - - -0.0182* 
(0.0095) 
0.0015 
(0.0068) 
 Social sciences - - -0.0088 
(0.0106) 
0.0230** 
(0.0101) 
 Life sciences - - -0.0286*** 
(0.0105) 
0.0048 
(0.0141) 
 Physical sciences - - -0.0074 
(0.0248) 
-0.0022 
(0.0168) 
 Mathematics - - -0.0100 
(0.0317) 
0.0329 
(0.0047) 
 Computer science - - -0.0284** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0132* 
(0.0077) 
 Engineering/engineering 
technology 
- - -0.0374*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.0173*** 
(0.0066) 
 Education - - -0.0209** 
(0.0105) 
 0.0016 
(0.0085) 
 Business - - -0.0304*** 
(0.0084) 
-0.0070 
(0.0061) 
 Health - - -0.0135 
(0.0104) 
0.0031 
(0.0073) 
 Vocational/technical - - -0.0308*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0147** 
(0.0057) 
 Other technical/professional - - -0.0284*** 
(0.0090) 
-0.0068 
(0.0065) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
(robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 In the first specification of Model #1, many sector variables are significant, as is the 
HBCU indicator. The indicator for Hispanic Serving Institutions is not. When student-level 
Table 6 cont. 
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variables are added into the second specification, a large amount of the significance of 
institutional effects disappears. The second specification of Model #1 reveals a significant 
number of insignificant factors. Degree earned, repayment amount, and parents’ income are 
among the most statistically significant variables. McFadden’s R-squared is 0.0679 and 0.2589 
in the first and second specification of Model #1, respectively. 
 The first specification of Model #2 reveals statistical significance in marginal effects of 
the college major variable, as they are compared to undeclared individuals. McFadden’s R-
squared is 0.0287. The second specification of Model #2 loses much but not all of the 
significance in the college major variable. Marginal effect significance and magnitude are largely 
similar to the second specification of Model #1. McFadden’s R-squared is 0.2796. 
Discussion 
 A significant amount of information can be drawn from the results of each model. This 
section will discuss various interpretations of each model and set of results, as well as compare 
specific statistical measures and methods used for analysis. 
Model #1 
The first specification of Model #1 includes sector and HBCU/HSI indicators as the only 
explanatory variables. Magnitude aside, several of these factors significantly correlate with 
changes in the likelihood of defaulting. Consistent with literature and policies, highest risk 
institutions include less than 2 year institutions, and for-profit institutions. There is more 
statistical significance in the first specification of Model #1 that includes all 16,680 observations 
(as seen in Appendix F). Even still, with less observations, many of the same implications are 
present. 
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 The second specification of Model #1 is intended to include additional individual 
characteristics in order to determine how meaningful institutional characteristics actually are 
with regards to the likelihood of defaulting. Another goal of this specification is to determine 
which factors, if any, are the most significant to whether or not a student loan borrower defaults. 
With the addition of such elements, nearly all significance related to institutional impact on 
default disappears.  
 Consistent with previous literature (Gladieux & Perna, 2005; Herr & Bert, 2005; 
Podgursky et al., 2002; Volkwein and Szelest, 1995; Volkwein et al., 1998; Wilms et al., 1987; 
Woo, 2002), whether or not the borrower finished school is perhaps the biggest determinant of 
default. Correlations are still significant and meaningful when controlling for post-graduate 
income; therefore, there must be additional reasons for this relationship other than the fact that 
higher education opens up employment opportunities. It is likely students’ persistence to 
graduate transfers into persistence to repay loans (Knapp & Seaks, 1992). 
This analysis, however, goes a step further and examines the differences in degree type. 
Borrowers who compete a bachelor’s degree are associated with a 3.93 percent decrease in the 
likelihood of defaulting than those with no degrees. Individuals with an associate’s degree are 
3.28 percent less likely to default than individuals with no degree. This is consistent with Steiner 
& Teslzer (2003). For comprehensive purposes, the same model was run but included degree 
completion versus non-completion, instead of which degree was earned, if any. By doing so, we 
can highlight the impact of completion alone, instead of the level of completion. According to 
marginal results (as shown in Appendix G), having any kind of degree decreases the likelihood 
of default by 2.98 percent on average. Including completion versus non-completion instead of 
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type of degree earned, however, reduces the significance and explanatory power of the model as 
a whole and therefore is not included in the final results.  
 The income variable is insignificant statistically and economically. This is likely due to 
the increased multicollinearity present as a result from imputing income. This is in line with Flint 
(1997) who finds income to not be very impactful, as many individuals without the ability to pay 
are in repayment, and some individuals with the ability to pay have defaulted.  
Dependent students’ parents’ income is extremely statistically significant but the 
magnitude of the marginal effect is virtually zero (with a negative sign). It makes sense that 
higher parental income would correlate with lower likelihood of defaulting. However, since the 
magnitude of the effect is so small, we cannot make any assumptions. 
 Average marginal effects of monthly repayment amounts are also small, but still 
significant and in line with economic theory. A larger monthly payment is associated with 
increased likelihood of defaulting. Such small effects can also largely be in response to the 
variation, or lack thereof, in the dependent variable. This is likely due to the fact that non-
borrowers are included as non-defaulters. 
 The unemployment variable is thought to be generally significant and meaningful, much 
like it has been found in previous research (Dynarski, 1994; Emmert, 1978; Looney & Yannelis, 
2015; Woo, 2002). According to the results, if a borrower has ever been unemployed for a period 
of three months or more, there is a 0.84 percent increase in the probability that borrower would 
default. 
 The effects of postsecondary GPA make intuitive sense as well. A negative marginal 
effect implies the higher a borrowers GPA relates to lower likelihood of defaulting.  
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 Age, gender, race, and marital status were placed in the model as controls and they 
ultimately proved to be insignificant. The lack of an effect of gender is consistent with some 
previous literature (Christman, 2000; Knapp & Seaks, 2002; Volkwein & Szelest, 1995). This 
also makes sense with literature that suggest women default more than men because many 
impoverished households are single, female parents (Hakim & Rashidian, 1995) and this analysis 
controls for income, marital status, and number of dependent children. Similarly, age is 
traditionally significant in previous research because older individuals typically face more 
financial responsibilities (Harrast, 2004; Herr & Bert, 2005); however, this model controls for 
such factors that previous research ignored, and therefore it is unsurprising the age variable is 
insignificant. 
The number of dependent children, high school GPA, and student employment all did not 
reveal significant estimates as well. The inclusion of such factors, however, increase the 
significance and fit of the model as a whole. Running the model without such variables decreases 
the R-squared (to 0.2134) and does not increase the number of observations. Moreover, the 
significant estimated average marginal effects do not change much if these insignificant variables 
are excluded. 
 Due to the nature of random missing data, the model must drop a significant number of 
observations to run a complete analysis. Even so, the number of observations left in the second 
specification is sufficient enough to maintain overall significance. 
Model #2 
Model #2 also includes two separate specifications. This time, however, the goal is to 
highlight the effects college major has on default. The first specification only includes 
major/field of study as explanatory variables. Most factors are statistically significant, with those 
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majoring in engineering, business, vocational, and life sciences being associated with the lowest 
likelihood of defaulting. The specification of Model #2 that includes all 16,680 observations 
(seen in Appendix F) reveals more significance, but the effects are interpreted similarly. 
 Adding in institutional and other individual characteristics, however, wipes out a large 
amount of the significance from college major variables, with the exception of social sciences, 
vocational/technical, and engineering. This is consistent with Lochner & Monge-Naranjo (2003), 
who find differences between majors largely disappear when control for income. Furthermore, 
although the R-squared increases slightly from Model #1 to Model #2, the estimated average 
marginal effects of individual characteristics (i.e. degree type, repayment amount, 
unemployment, race, etc.) are largely unchanged. 
Limitations 
 Every study has its limitations. The largest potential limitation of this study is a small 
sample size. Due to the nature of random missing observations, a significant number of 
observations had to be dropped to make the model run effectively. Due to time constraints, 
expanding the sample to other years was nearly impossible. Even so, the results are significant 
and meaningful in many respects. 
 Moreover, there are some factors that have been included in previous research that were 
unavailable in this dataset and therefore were excluded. These include, but are not limited to, exit 
counseling, continuous enrollment, credit hours earned/failed, and knowledge of repayment. 
 A major issue is the presence of multicollinearity. As mentioned before, by imputing 
income using variables that are already in the default model, there is inherent multicollinearity. 
In addition, correlation analysis reveals number of dependents appears to be partially correlated 
with marital status and age, while high school GPA, postsecondary GPA, and degree level are 
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mildly connected. Furthermore, there are likely confounding variables associated with 
persistence to graduate, persistence to do well in school (i.e. GPA), and persistence to repay 
student loans. For the sake of this research, we acknowledge the presence of such effects and 
take caution when making interpretations. 
Conclusions and Future Research 
 This analysis has evaluated student loan default among students of all types of 
institutions and it produces significant and potentially useful implications. The level of 
completion stands out as a driving force behind lowering student loan default. Graduation largely 
opens employment options and raises earnings, meaning borrowers are more able to meet 
repayment requirements. For such reasons, retention and completion programs could serve to 
lower institutional cohort default rates. As explained before, however, there are other factors in 
play as well as unobservable student characteristics, such as internal motivations, also operating 
to reduce default rates. 
Continuing work may include similar model types that instead examine factors 
particularly affecting repayment instead of default. Moreover, additional data and time would 
allow for similar research regarding delinquency, deferment, and forbearance, all of which affect 
the well-being of students and can have larger economic implications. 
Altogether, however, results from this analysis warn against placing blame on the 
institutions themselves for having high cohort default rates, when it is likely that they have 
disproportionate number of students that are characteristically more likely to default. Likewise, 
targeting individual academic programs for having high default rates may also be premature. The 
evidence presented in this paper creates sufficient doubt on the efficiency and usefulness of 
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current policies that penalize institutions for having high default rates. These results consistently 
point to student characteristics as being of major importance in predicting likelihood of default. 
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APPENDIX A: EDUCATION COST ONE-WAY T-TEST RESULTS 
Data for education cost research is from the Baccalaureate & Beyond Longitudinal Study 
(B&B) taken from the National Center for Education Statistics. This survey examines students’ 
education and work experience after completing their bachelor’s degrees. B&B gets its cohort of 
participants from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS). Participants are 
representative of graduating seniors of all majors. The third cohort (roughly 19,000 participants) 
was surveyed originally in 2008 and followed up with in 2009 and 2012. This cohort is being 
used for this analysis. Note, this data only represents those who graduated with a bachelor’s 
degree or greater. It does not consider students who did not graduate, or those who graduated 
with other degrees at the initial time of the survey. Below is a table outlining the descriptions of 
variables used. 
Table 7 - Variable descriptions 
Variable Name Variable Label 
B2FAFFCHLD Education cost: Delayed having children, in 2012 
B2FAFFEDJB Education cost: Taken job instead of enrolling in more education, in 2012 
B2FAFFHOME Education cost: Delayed buying a home, in 2012 
B2FAFFLESS Education cost: Taken job outside of field, in 2012 
B2FAFFMARR Education cost: Delayed getting married, in 2012 
B2FAFFWKMR Education cost: Work more than desired, in 2012 
 
Table 8 - T-test results 
Null hypothesis: mean(VARIABLE) = 0; 
Alternative hypothesis: mean(VARIABLE) > 0; 
Variable n Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. df t-statistic Pr(T>t) 
B2FAFFCHLD 14,570 0.3129 0.0038 0.4638 14,564 81.43 0.0000 
B2FAFFEDJB 14,110 0.3034 0.0039 0.4597 14,112 78.37 0.0000 
B2FAFFHOME 14,570 0.4141 0.0041 0.4926 14,565 101.45 0.0000 
B2FAFFLESS 14,110 0.4054 0.0041 0.4910 14,112 98.10 0.0000 
B2FAFFMARR 14,570 0.2350 0.0035 0.4240 14,564 66.89 0.0000 
B2FAFFWKMR 14,110 0.3659 0.0041 0.4817 14,112 90.24 0.0000 
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APPENDIX B: INCOME OLS REGRESSION FOR IMPUTATION 
Table 9 - Income OLS regression results 
Dependent Variable Ln (annual income) 
Number of Observations 9,280 
R-squared 0.2001 
 Coefficient Estimates Standard Errors 
Gender -0.0082*** 0.0113 
Age 0.0030*** 0.0008 
Race (compared to white) 
 Black or African American -0.0475*** 0.0168 
 Hispanic or Latino 0.0080 0.0165 
 Asian -0.0423** 0.0260 
 American Indian or Alaska Native -0.0423 0.0618 
 Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander -0.1019 0.1027 
 Other 0.0648 0.0477 
 More than one race 0.0149 0.0320 
Highest degree (compared to an individual with no degree) 
 Certificate -0.0188 0.0181 
 Associate degree 0.0415** 0.0196 
 Bachelor’s degree 0.1743*** 0.0039 
Postsecondary GPA -0.0263*** 0.0039 
College major (general) (compared to undeclared student) 
 Humanities -0.0313 0.0209 
 Social/behavioral sciences -0.0321 0.0227 
 Life sciences -0.0929*** 0.0297 
 Physical sciences 0.0503 0.0713 
 Mathematics 0.0679 0.0713 
 Computer science 0.0870*** 0.0308 
 Engineering/engineering technologies 0.2661*** 0.0289 
 Education -0.1101*** 0.0253 
 Business 0.0427** 0.0194 
 Health 0.1223*** 0.0207 
 Vocational/technical 0.0301 0.0260 
 Other technical/professional -0.0351 0.0219 
Hours worked per week 0.0176*** 0.0005 
Unemployed 3 months or more -0.0995*** 0.0131 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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APPENDIX C: BEGINNING POSTSECONDARY STUDENTS LONGITUDINAL 
SURVEY: VARIABLE NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS 
Table 10 - Variable descriptions 
Variable Name Variable Label 
ID Analysis ID 
AGE Age first year enrolled 
AT1TY6Y First degree type attained through 2009 
CARAMT09 Monthly car loan payment 2009 
CONTROL NPSAS institution control 2003-04 
CRDBAL09 Credit cards: Balance due 2009 
CUMOWE09 Cumulative total student loan amount owed in 2009 
DEPEND Dependency status 2003-04 
DEPINC Dependent student’s family income 2003-04 
DEPNUM09 Number of dependent children in 2009 
GENDER Gender 
GPALAST Grade point average estimate when last enrolled through 2009 
HBCU Historical Black College indicator 2003-04 
HCGPAREP High school grade point average (GPA) 
INCRES09 Respondent’s annual income in 2009 
JOBHRS09 Average hours worked weekly in 2009 
LEVEL NPSAS institution level 2003-04 
LOANST09 Federal student loan repayment status in 2009 
MAJ09C Major when last enrolled any year through 2009 (condensed) 
MTGAMT09 Monthly mortgage or rent payment in 2009 
OBEREG Institution region 2003-04 
OCRHSI Hispanic serving institution 2003-04 
RACE Race 
RPYAMT09 Monthly student loan repayments 2009 
SMAR09 Marital status in 2009 
UNEMPG09 Ever unemployed 3 months or more through 2009 
  
Generated Variables Variable Label 
bSMAR09 Marital status (married or not) 
DEFAULT09 Ever defaulted on student loans through 2009 
DEGREE09 Completed any degree through 2009 
iINCRES09 Imputed annual income in 2009 
OTHEREXP09 Other expenses (housing, car, credit card costs) in 2009 
SECTOR Sector of institution 2003-04 
WORKINSCH Student employment in school 
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APPENDIX D: STATA CODE (DO-FILES) FOR DATA CLEANING 
* Ari Castonguay 
* BPS 2004-09 Survey  
* Data Cleaning DO FILE 
 
clear all 
set more off 
 
use "/Users/guest1/Desktop/Castonguay - THESIS/BPS 2004-09/F9DERIV.dta" 
 
keep ID LEVEL SECTOR9 CONTROL BUDGETAJ OBEREG OCRHSI HBCU CC2005B AT1TY3Y AT1TY6Y /// 
 ATDEG3Y ATDEG6Y ATHTY3Y ATHTY6Y ATTNPTRN DEPEND CUMOWE06 CUMOWE09 T4XOWE06 T4XOWE09 /// 
 STUCUM06 STUCUM09 STSCUM06 STSCUM09 PERCUM06 PERCUM09 LNHELP09 RPYAMT09 CAGI INCRES05 /// 
 INCRES09 DEPNUM06 DEPNUM09 MTGAMT06 MTGAMT09 CRDBAL06 CRDBAL09 CARAMT06 CARAMT09 /// 
 NETCST32 DEPINC INDEPINC TFEDGRT MAJ09C JOBRLM06 JOBRLM09 GPALAST CWTHD06 /// 
 HCGPAREP GENDER RACE AGE UNEMPT06 UNEMPN06 UNEMPT09 UNEMPN09 UNEMPG09 /// 
 JOBHRS06 JOBHOUR2 JOBHRS09 SMARITAL SMAR06 SMAR09 SPSOWE06 SPSOWE09 SPSBOR09 /// 
 SPSRPY09 LOANST06 LOANST09 JOBOCC09 JOBHOUR2 remetook 
 
label var ID "Identification #" 
rename remetook REMETOOK 
 
*generate dummy variable - no federal loans 2006 
gen NOLOANS06=1 if LOANST06==0 
replace NOLOANS06=0 if LOANST06!=0 
label var NOLOANS06 "no federal loans in 2006" 
*generate dummy variable - loans paid in full or cancelled 2006 
gen PAID06=1 if LOANST06==1 
replace PAID06=0 if LOANST06!=1 
label var PAID06 "loans paid in full or cancelled in 2006" 
*generate dummy variable - loans in repayment 2006 
gen REPAYMENT06=1 if LOANST06==2 
replace REPAYMENT06=0 if LOANST06!=2 
label var REPAYMENT06 "loans in repayment in 2006" 
*generate dummy variable - loans in deferment or forbearance 2006 
gen DEFER06=1 if LOANST06==3 
replace DEFER06=0 if LOANST06!=3 
label var DEFER06 "loans in deferment or forbearance in 2006" 
*generate dummy variable - loans in default 2006 
gen DEFAULT06=1 if LOANST06==4 
replace DEFAULT06=0 if LOANST06!=4 
label var DEFAULT06 "loans in defailt in 2006" 
*generate dummy variable - loans not in repayment 2006 
gen NOREPAY06=1 if LOANST06==5 
replace NOREPAY06=0 if LOANST06!=5 
label var NOREPAY06 "loans not in repayment in 2006" 
 
*generate dummy variable - no federal loans 2009 
gen NOLOANS09=1 if LOANST09==0 
replace NOLOANS09=0 if LOANST09!=0 
label var NOLOANS09 "no federal loans in 2009" 
*generate dummy variable - loans paid in full or cancelled 2009 
gen PAID09=1 if LOANST09==1 
replace PAID09=0 if LOANST09!=1 
label var PAID09 "loans paid in full or cancelled in 2009" 
*generate dummy variable - loans in repayment 2009 
gen REPAYMENT09=1 if LOANST09==2 
replace REPAYMENT09=0 if LOANST09!=2 
label var REPAYMENT09 "loans in repayment in 2009" 
*generate dummy variable - loans in deferment or forbearance 2009 
gen DEFER09=1 if LOANST09==3 
replace DEFER09=0 if LOANST09!=3 
label var DEFER09 "loans in deferment or forbearance in 2009" 
*generate dummy variable - loans in default 2009 
gen DEFAULT09=1 if LOANST09==4 
replace DEFAULT09=0 if LOANST09!=4 
label var DEFAULT09 "loans in defailt in 2009" 
*generate dummy variable - loans not in repayment 2009 
gen NOREPAY09=1 if LOANST09==5 
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replace NOREPAY09=0 if LOANST09!=5 
label var NOREPAY09 "loans not in repayment in 2009" 
 
*generate graduation dummy variables 
gen DEGREE06=0 if ATHTY3Y==0 
replace DEGREE06=1 if ATHTY3Y!=0 
label var DEGREE06 "completed degree or not" 
label values DEGREE06 "degree06" 
label define degree06 0 "No degree" 1 "Completed degree" 
gen DEGREE09=0 if ATHTY6Y==0 
replace DEGREE09=1 if ATHTY6Y!=0 
label var DEGREE09 "completed degree or not" 
label values DEGREE09 "degree09" 
label define degree09 0 "No degree" 1 "Completed degree" 
 
*fix SECTOR9 variable 
gen SECTOR=1 if LEVEL==1 & CONTROL==1 
replace SECTOR=2 if LEVEL==2 & CONTROL==1 
replace SECTOR=3 if LEVEL==3 & CONTROL==1 
replace SECTOR=4 if LEVEL==1 & CONTROL==2 
replace SECTOR=5 if LEVEL==2 & CONTROL==2 
replace SECTOR=6 if LEVEL==3 & CONTROL==2 
replace SECTOR=7 if LEVEL==1 & CONTROL==3 
replace SECTOR=8 if LEVEL==2 & CONTROL==3 
replace SECTOR=9 if LEVEL==3 & CONTROL==3 
label var SECTOR "sector" 
label values SECTOR "sector" 
label define sector 1 "Public 4 year" 2 "Private Nonprofit 4 year" 3 "Private For-profit 4 year" 
/// 
 4 "Public 2 year" 5 "Private Nonprofit 2 year" 6 "Private For-profit 2 year" /// 
 7 "Public Less than 2 year" 8 "Private Nonprofit Less than 2 year" 9 "Private For-profit 
Less than 2 year" 
 
*fill in missing monthly repayment observations 
replace RPYAMT09=0 if CUMOWE09==0 // monthly repayment=0 if cumulative amount owed=0 
 
*generate binary race variable  
gen bRACE=0 if RACE==1 
replace bRACE=1 if RACE!=1 
label var bRACE "Race - white or non-white" 
label values bRACE bRACE 
label define bRACE 0 "white" 1 "non-white" 
 
*generate black binary race variable 
gen bbRACE=0 if RACE!=2 
replace bbRACE=1 if RACE==2 
label var bbRACE " Race - black or non-black" 
label values bbRACE bbRACE 
label define bbRACE 0 "non-black" 1 "black" 
 
*generate binary marriage variable 2009 
gen bSMAR09=0 if SMAR09!=2 
replace bSMAR09=1 if SMAR09==2 
label var bSMAR09 "Marital statis - married or not married 2009" 
label values bSMAR09 bSMAR09 
label define bSMAR09 0 "not married" 1 "married" 
 
*fill in missing spouse repayment observations 
replace SPSOWE09=0 if bSMAR09==0 // unmarried obvs become 0 
replace SPSRPY09=0 if bSMAR09==0 // unmarried obvs become 0 
 
*generate other expenses variable (mortgage/rent + credit cards + car payment) for 2009 
gen OTHEREXP09=MTGAMT09+CRDBAL09+CARAMT09 
label var OTHEREXP09 "other expenses - mortgage/rent + credit cards + car payment 2009" 
 
*generate Depenency status/Parent's incoem interaction variable 
gen DDEPINC=DEPEND*DEPINC 
label var DDEPINC "dependent's parents' income IF dependnet student" 
 
*generate working while in school dummy variable 
gen WORKINSCH=1 if JOBHOUR2>0 
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replace WORKINSCH=0 if JOBHOUR2==0 
label var WORKINSCH "Student employment" 
label values WORKINSCH WORKINSCH 
label define WORKINSCH 0 "did not work while enrolled in school" 1 "worked while enrolled in 
school" 
 
*recode postsecondary gpa variable so higher value corresponds to higher GPA 
recode GPALAST (1=7) (2=6) (3=5) (4=4) (5=3) (6=2) (7=1) 
label values GPALAST GPALAST 
label define GPALAST 1 "below 1.24" 2 "1.25-1.74" 3 "1.75-2.24" 4 "2.25-2.74" 5 "2.75-3.24" 6 
"3.25-3.74" 7 "3.75+"  
  
*replace all negative values with missing(.) 
foreach var of varlist ID-DDEPINC { 
 replace (`var')=. if `var'<0 
 } 
 
*test income regressions to determine which variables to use to impute 
gen logincome = log(INCRES09) // create log of income for dependent variable 
regress logincome GENDER AGE i.RACE i.ATHTY6Y GPALAST i.MAJ09C JOBHRS09 UNEMPG09 
estimates store incomeregression 
estimates table incomeregression, se 
 
*impute missing income variables 
mi set wide // set mi as wide form  
mi register imputed logincome 
mi impute regress logincome GENDER AGE i.RACE i.ATHTY6Y GPALAST i.MAJ09C JOBHRS09 UNEMPG09, 
add(1) force // impute income variable - stored as _1_logincome 
gen iINCRES09 = exp(_1_logincome) //return income (including imputations) to normal form (not in 
a log) 
replace iINCRES09=0 if iINCRES09<0 // fix negative imputed income values 
label var iINCRES09 "imputed income in 2009" 
 
  
save "/Users/guest1/Desktop/Castonguay - THESIS/BPS 2004-09/BPS 2004-09.dta", replace 
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APPENDIX E: STATA CODE (DO-FILES) FOR ANALYSIS 
* Ari Castonguay 
* BPS 2004-09 Survey  
* CHAPTER TWO DO FILE 
 
clear all 
cls 
set more off 
 
use "/Users/guest1/Desktop/Castonguay - THESIS/BPS 2004-09/BPS 2004-09.dta" 
 
log using "/Users/guest1/Desktop/Castonguay - THESIS/BPS 2004-09/Analysis LOG.smcl", append 
 
* Generate descriptive statistics 
tab ATHTY6Y 
tab LOANST09 
tab SECTOR 
tab HBCU 
tab OCRHSI 
tab DEPEND 
tab MAJ09C 
tab GENDER 
tab RACE 
tab SMAR09 
tab UNEMPG09 
tab WORKINSCH 
tab HCGPAREP  
tab GPALAST 
sum CUMOWE09 RPYAMT09 INCRES09 DEPNUM09 MTGAMT09 CRDBAL09 CARAMT09 DEPINC AGE  
 
* Generate variance/co-variance matric of all variables 
pwcorr DEFAULT09 MAJ09C SECTOR HBCU OCRHSI DDEPINC iINCRES09 DEPNUM09 GENDER RACE /// 
 bSMAR09 AGE ATHTY6Y RPYAMT09 UNEMPG09 OTHEREXP09 GPALAST HCGPAREP WORKINSCH /// 
 DEGREE09, sig 
 
* Model 1 - probit regression default on institutional characteristics only (using all 
observations) 
probit DEFAULT09 i.SECTOR HBCU OCRHSI, robust 
margins, dydx(*) 
 
* Model 1 - probit regression default on institutional and borrower characteristics 
 
probit DEFAULT09 i.SECTOR HBCU OCRHSI DDEPINC iINCRES09 DEPNUM09 GENDER i.RACE /// 
 i.bSMAR09 AGE i.ATHTY6Y RPYAMT09 UNEMPG09 OTHEREXP09 GPALAST HCGPAREP WORKINSCH, robust 
// measures effect of level of completion (i.e. degree type) 
margins, dydx(*) 
gen restrict = e(sample) 
 
probit DEFAULT09 i.SECTOR HBCU OCRHSI DDEPINC iINCRES09 DEPNUM09 GENDER i.RACE /// 
 i.bSMAR09 AGE DEGREE09 RPYAMT09 UNEMPG09 OTHEREXP09 GPALAST HCGPAREP WORKINSCH, robust // 
measures the effect of completion vs. non-copletion 
margins, dydx(*) 
 
* Model 1 - probit regression default on institutional characteristics only (using only complete 
observations from student characteristics observations) 
probit DEFAULT09 i.SECTOR HBCU OCRHSI if restrict==1, robust 
margins, dydx(*) 
 
* Model 2 - probit regression default on college major alone 
 
probit DEFAULT09 i.MAJ09C, robust // measures the effects of majors on default 
margins, dydx(*) 
 
* Model 2 - probit regression default on college major and other institutional/borrower 
characteristics 
 
probit DEFAULT09 i.MAJ09C i.SECTOR HBCU OCRHSI DDEPINC iINCRES09 DEPNUM09 GENDER i.RACE /// 
 i.bSMAR09 AGE i.ATHTY6Y RPYAMT09 UNEMPG09 OTHEREXP09 GPALAST HCGPAREP WORKINSCH, robust 
// controls for other important variables as well as college major 
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margins, dydx(*) 
 
* Model 2 - probit regression default on college major only (using only complete observations 
from student characteristics observations) 
probit DEFAULT09 i.MAJ09C if restrict==1, robust 
margins, dydx(*) 
  
save "/Users/guest1/Desktop/Castonguay - THESIS/BPS 2004-09/Analysis LOG.smcl", replace 
log close   
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APPENDIX F: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF MODEL #1 AND MODEL #2 WITH FULL 
SET OF OBSERVATIONS 
Table 11 – Regression results 
Dependent Variable Whether or not the borrower defaulted 
Number of Observations 16,680 16,680 
R-squared 0.1137 0.0208 
 Model #1 Model #2 
Sector (compared to Public 4 year) 
 Private nonprofit 4 year 0.0099*** 
(0.0028) 
- 
 Private for-profit 4 year -0.0028 
(0.0058) 
- 
 Public 2 year -0.0021 
(0.0026) 
- 
 Private nonprofit 2 year 0.0557*** 
(0.0135) 
- 
 Private for-profit 2 year 0.0730** 
(0.0340) 
- 
 Public less than 2 year 0.0776*** 
(0.0151) 
- 
 Private nonprofit less than 2 year 0.1314*** 
(0.0155) 
- 
 Private for-profit less than 2 year 0.1410*** 
(0.0114) 
- 
HBCU indicator 0.0361*** 
(0.0079) 
- 
Hispanic Serving Institution indicator 0.0079 
(0.0048) 
- 
College major (general) (compared to undeclared) 
 Humanities - -0.0292*** 
(0.0062) 
 Social science - -0.0307*** 
(0.0064) 
 Life science - -0.0496*** 
(0.0059) 
 Physical science - -0.0067 
(0.0163) 
 Mathematics - -0.0500*** 
(0.0070) 
 Computer science - -0.0070 
(0.0106) 
 Engineering/engineering technology - -0.0417*** 
(0.0070) 
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 Education - -0.0443*** 
(0.0061) 
 Business - -0.0337*** 
(0.0058) 
 Health - -0.0160** 
(0.0066) 
 Vocational/technical - -0.0273*** 
(0.0078) 
 Other technical/professional - -0.0260*** 
(0.0066) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
(robust standard errors in parentheses) 
  
Table 11 cont. 
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APPENDIX G: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF MODEL #1 HIGHLIGHTING DEGREE 
COMPLETION 
Table 12 - Regression results 
Dependent Variable Whether or not the borrower defaulted 
Number of Observations 5,370 
R-squared 0.2315 
 Marginal Effects Robust Standard 
Errors 
Sector (compared to Public 4 year) 
 Private nonprofit 4 year -0.0074 0.0047 
 Private for-profit 4 year not estimable - 
 Public 2 year 0.0021 0.0059 
 Private nonprofit 2 year 0.0069 0.0128 
 Private for-profit 2 year 0.0931 0.0701 
 Public less than 2 year -0.0032 0.0098 
 Private nonprofit less than 2 year 0.0584*** 0.0209 
 Private for-profit less than 2 year 0.0401** 0.0157 
HBCU indicator 0.0056 0.0109 
Hispanic Serving Institution indicator -0.0040 0.0070 
Completed degree -0.0298*** 0.0052 
Monthly repayment amount 0.0000*** 0.0000 
Annual income -0.0000* 0.0000 
Other expenditures -0.0000** 0.0000 
Dependent student’s parents’ income -0.0000*** 0.0000 
Age -0.0011 0.0019 
Gender (male) -0.0002 0.0039 
Race (compared to white) 
 Black or African American 0.0067 0.0059 
 Hispanic or Latino 0.0109* 0.0063 
 Asian 0.0019 0.0101 
 American Indian or Alaska Native 0.0131 0.0220 
 Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander not estimable - 
 Other not estimable - 
 More than one race 0.0422** 0.0185 
Married -0.0018 0.0045 
Number of dependents 0.0034 0.0022 
Unemployed 3 months or more 0.0087** 0.0040 
Postsecondary GPA -0.0025** 0.0012 
High School GPA -0.0024 0.0017 
Student employment 0.0066 0.0044 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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